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Abstract
This thesis investigates how the theoretical predictions of traditional economic mod-
els change when the assumption of Bayesian decision making is relaxed. Bayesian deci-
sion theory assumes that decision makers are able to perfectly describe their state space
and assign a single prior to every possible event. The theory of unawareness relaxes
the first assumption by allowing decision makers to be aware of some contingencies and
unaware of others. The theory of ambiguity relaxes the second assumption and allows
decision makers to prefer known risks over unknown risks.
The first chapter of this thesis analyzes the effect of ambiguity on bilateral trade
in the presence of private information. It demonstrates that in an environment with
adverse selection as in Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons, screening the informed
party hedges against ambiguity. It further shows that the presence of ambiguity can
be both beneficial or harmful for trade. If the adverse selection problem is sufficiently
severe, more ambiguity surprisingly leads to more trade and thereby increase surplus.
Using these results, a financial market application demonstrates that ambiguity may
help to explain why some assets are optimally traded over-the-counter rather than on
traditional exchanges, and suggests that opacity may be essential to sustain such trade.
The second chapter of this thesis introduces asymmetric awareness into a classical
principal-agent model with moral hazard, and shows how unawareness can give rise
to incomplete contracts.1 The paper investigates the optimal contract between a fully
aware principal and an unaware agent, where the principal can enlarge the agent’s
awareness strategically. When proposing the contract, the principal faces a tradeoff
between participation and incentives: leaving the agent unaware allows the principal to
exploit the agent’s incomplete understanding of the world, relaxing the participation
constraint, while making the agent aware enables the principal to use the revealed con-
tingencies as signals about the agent’s action choice, relaxing the incentive constraint.
The optimal contract reveals contingencies that have low probability but are highly
informative about the agent’s effort.
1This paper was published in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.82, 2013.
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Chapter 1
Bilateral Trade Under Ambiguity
1.1 Introduction
The optimal design of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information has been the
subject of investigation for several decades and its theoretical analysis has generated an ar-
ray of powerful results. Most of this literature adopts the subjective expected utility model,
according to which contracting parties have a single subjective prior belief about the fun-
damentals. In real-life contracting situations, e.g. when buying a house or when investing
in a foreign country, the involved parties rarely have a precise idea about the underlying
probability distribution, either because they do not have enough experience or because they
do not have sufficient information. It is well established that a lack of knowledge about the
probability distribution, typically referred to as ambiguity, has important behavioral impli-
cations that are incompatible with the subjective expected utility hypothesis. This gives rise
to the question of how the presence of uncertainty over probabilistic scenarios affects the
optimal design of contracts and the implemented allocation.
As an illustrative example, consider the exchange of financial assets in over-the-counter
(OTC) markets. In contrast to traditional stock exchanges, term of trade in OTC markets
are negotiated directly between two parties. OTC markets are frequently referred to as dark
or opaque because there is often little or no information about past transaction prices or
quantities (Duffie, 2012). It has been argued that this lack of transparency may inhibit
traders’ ability to understand the odds in such markets, and thereby gives rise to ambiguity
(e.g. Cheng and Zhong, 2012). Given the recent debate among academics and policy makers
on the economic effects of transparency mandating policies in financial markets, the question
1
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of how the presence of ambiguity affects the trading decisions of economic agents in such
trading environments has received increasing attention. The paper addresses this question
in a general bilateral trade model that allows for common values, an important feature in
financial trading, and an ambiguous trading environment.
In the basic model, a risk-neutral buyer (she) makes an offer to a risk-neutral seller (he),
who is privately informed about the quality of his good. The buyer has ambiguous beliefs
about the distribution of quality and is ambiguity-averse. The preferences of the buyer are
represented by the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), according
to which the buyer evaluates her choices with the most pessimistic probability distribution
in a set of distributions. The quality of the good can be either high or low, and determines
the valuations of both trading parties. The buyer thus faces ambiguity over both her valu-
ation of the good and the seller’s willingness to accept her offer. The extent of both types
of ambiguity is determined by the buyer’s offer: if the buyer offers a price above the valu-
ation of the high-quality seller, she is sure to trade but faces ambiguity over her valuation
of the good. If the buyer offers a price below the valuation of the high-quality seller, she is
sure to buy low quality but faces ambiguity over her probability of trade. When proposing
a contract, the ambiguity-averse buyer faces a tradeoff between these two types of ambiguity.
Samuelson (1984) shows that the optimal contract in the absence of ambiguity is a take-it-
or-leave-it price. The first main result of this paper demonstrates that the optimal contract
in the presence of ambiguity is a screening menu rather than a posted price: low quality
is traded at a low price with certainty, while high quality is traded at a high price proba-
bilistically. The optimal screening menu balances the buyer’s ex-ante expected utility across
probabilistic scenarios and thereby hedges against ambiguity. To show how optimal screen-
ing under ambiguity aversion differs from screening contracts in the existing literature, the
properties of the equilibrium contract are contrasted to those of an alternative model in
which the buyer is ambiguity-neutral but risk-averse. The paper shows that a key differ-
ence between the two models is how the relative gains from trade affect the equilibrium
contract and proposes a simple comparative statics exercise along these lines, demonstrating
the testable implications of the model.
The second main result of the paper shows that the two types of ambiguity in this con-
tracting problem have opposing effects on the level trade. To identify the two effects, a
benchmark setting with ambiguous but independent valuations is considered, allowing for
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a separate variation of the extent of ambiguity over the buyer’s and the seller’s valuation.
The paper shows that the presence of ambiguity over the buyer’s valuation is harmful for
trade, while the presence of ambiguity over the seller’s valuation is beneficial for trade. The
intuition for the first effect is that ambiguity over the buyer’s valuation leads the buyer to
overweigh the event in which her valuation is low. This reduces her perceived gains from
trade and therefore has a negative effect on trade. Ambiguity over the seller’s valuation, on
the other hand, leads the buyer to overweigh the event in which the seller’s valuation is high,
which makes pooling more attractive and consequently has a positive effect on trade. When
valuations are perfectly correlated, these two cases are mutually exclusive and the net effect
of ambiguity on trade may be positive or negative. The analysis shows that if the variation
in the seller’s valuation is large enough, the effect of ambiguity over the seller’s valuation
dominates and more ambiguity leads to weakly more trade.
Applying these results to a financial market environment provides some novel insights on
off-exchange trading and market transparency. The paper proposes a stylized example which
demonstrates that if opacity gives rise to ambiguity, trading financial assets in opaque OTC
markets may lead to more trade and a larger surplus compared to traditional exchanges. It
is assumed that there is a measure of buyers and sellers that can either trade competitively
in a centralized market a` la Akerlof (1970), or trade bilaterally in a decentralized exchange
environment. The analysis shows that if the adverse selection problem is sufficiently severe
such that trade of the high-quality asset is precluded in the Akerlof market, decentralization
can restore efficiency partially if and only if the trading environment is sufficiently ambigu-
ous. This result stems from the positive effect of ambiguity under bilateral contracting,
and highlights a new aspect in the recent debate on ‘dark trading’ in financial markets.
It demonstrates that ambiguity may help to explain why some assets are optimally traded
over-the-counter rather than on traditional exchanges, and suggests that opacity may be
essential to sustain such trade.
Extensions: For a given set of measures, the maxmin expected utility model may be
seen as a limiting case of the smooth ambiguity model with infinite ambiguity aversion. The
smooth ambiguity model, developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005), has very robust features and
allows for a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. The paper extends the
characterization of the optimal contract to this representation and shows that the optimal
contract under smooth ambiguity aversion is a convex combination of the optimal contract
under maxmin preferences and ambiguity neutrality. As ambiguity aversion increases, the
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solution under smooth ambiguity aversion converges to the optimal contract under maxmin
expected utility. Next, the assumption on the number of quality types is relaxed and a
setting with continuously distributed quality is considered. As in the basic model, the opti-
mal contract is a screening menu if the extent of ambiguity is sufficiently large, whereas it
is a posted price if the extent of ambiguity is sufficiently small. In contrast to the binary
type setting, there is an intermediate parameter region of ambiguity in which the optimal
contract exhibits partial screening. The optimal degree of screening increases in the extent
of ambiguity the buyer faces, reflecting the hedging function of screening. The paper derives
conditions for these three cases and provides a complete characterization of the optimal con-
tract.
Related Literature: Previous literature on ambiguity and bilateral trade has focussed
on private rather than common value environments. Most closely related to this paper is the
work by Bergemann and Schlag (2008 and 2011). They analyze a monopoly pricing model
in which the principal follows a maxmin decision rule, or alternatively, a minimax regret
criterion. The papers’ main focus lies on regret preferences because in the private value
case, ambiguity aversion does not affect the design of the optimal contract. This can be seen
in the context of a special case in this paper: when the buyer’s valuation does not depend
on quality, the buyer only faces ambiguity over the seller’s valuation, and the worst-case
probabilistic scenario is generally given by the probability distribution with maximal weight
on the high-quality good. This implies that the optimization problem under maxmin pref-
erences is equivalent to the optimization problem under a single pessimistic prior, and the
optimal contract is a posted price as in Samuelson (1984). The minimax regret criterion, on
the other hand, generates a regret tradeoff that makes posted prices suboptimal. In contrast
to this paper, the tradeoff is driven by the principal’s aversion to forgone opportunities in a
private value setting rather than a hedging motive against the two types of ambiguity that
arise in a common value environment.
Furthermore, there is a recent literature on ambiguity and mechanism design in the
Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983) environment with private values, e.g. Bodoh-Creed (2012),
Bose and Mutuswami (2012), De Castro and Yannelis (2012) and Wolitzky (2014). This lit-
erature focusses on the implementability of efficient trade rather than the design of contracts.
It explores the link between ambiguity and rent extraction and shows under which conditions
ambiguity can change agents’ incentives to reveal their type. In contrast to those papers,
ambiguity in the proposed model leaves incentives unaffected and enters the principal’s pay-
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off function instead, thereby affecting the design of the optimal contract. Other papers that
deal with games and mechanisms in ambiguous environments are Lo (1998), Mukerji (1998),
Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape (2006), Lopomo et al. (2009), and Carroll (2013). Additionally,
recent papers such as Bose and Renou (2013), Di Tillio et al. (2012) and Riedel and Sass
(2014) introduce ambiguous mechanisms and strategic ambiguity into games. Finally, there
is a considerable body of literature on ambiguity aversion and trade in partial and general
equilibrium. Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994), Mukerji and Tallon (2001),
Rigotti et al. (2008), and De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011) among others provide condi-
tions under which ambiguity aversion precludes trade and leads to inefficient allocations and
incomplete markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the contracting
problem, characterizes the optimal contract, and discusses the differences between ambiguity
aversion and risk aversion in this setting. Section 1.3 shows the effect of ambiguity on trade
and develops the financial market application. Section 1.4 characterizes the optimal contract
under smooth ambiguity aversion, and Section 1.5 extends the main results to a framework
with a continuum of types. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Optimal Contracting Under Ambiguity
Environment: A risk-neutral buyer makes an offer to a risk-neutral seller. The seller pos-
sesses one unit of an indivisible good which can be either of high quality or of low quality.
The seller is privately informed about the quality of the object, which determines both his
valuation and the buyer’s valuation. If the quality of the good is high (low), the seller’s
valuation is ch (cl) and the buyer’s valuation is vh (vl), where ch > cl and vh > vl. For both
types of good, the buyer’s valuation exceeds the seller’s valuation, implying that there are
certain gains from trade: vi > ci, i = l, h.
Ambiguity: Let σ denote the probability with which the quality of the good is high. In
contrast to the standard framework, the buyer does not have a unique subjective prior belief
but considers multiple values of σ possible. Ambiguity-sensitive preferences can be captured
by a variety of decision-theoretic models (for a recent survey see Gilboa and Marinacci
(2013)). The basic set up of this paper employs Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin
expected utility model. This representation facilitates the exposition considerably but the
basic insights of the model are more general. The analysis will show that the main results are
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driven by the buyer’s desire to hedge against ambiguity, and thus can easily be extended to
other models that allow for ambiguity aversion, e.g. the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff
et al., 2005, see Section 1.4). In the maxmin expected utility model, the decision maker
evaluates her choices with the worst probability distribution in a set of distributions. Let
Eσ[pib] denote the buyer’s expected utility evaluated at σ and let Σ = [σ, σ] denote a set of
probability distributions. The buyer’s maxmin expected utility is given by
ΠMEU = min
σ∈Σ
Eσ[pib].
Note that if σ = σ such that Σ is a singleton, the min-operator has no bite and the buyer is
a standard subjective expected utility maximizer. Otherwise ambiguity matters, and ambi-
guity aversion affects the contracting problem.
Contract: The buyer proposes a menu of contracts, {(αi, pi)}i=l,h, consisting of a trading
probability αi and a price pi for each type of good.
1 Price pi is paid independently of whether
the good is transferred or not and can be interpreted as an expected price. The buyer’s and
seller’s ex-post expected payoffs are given by pib = αvi − p and pis = p − αci, respectively.
The buyer maximizes ΠMEU subject to the participation and incentive constraints of each
type of seller:
pl − αlcl ≥ 0, (PCl),
ph − αhch ≥ 0, (PCh),
pl − αlcl ≥ ph − αhcl, (ICl),
ph − αhch ≥ pl − αlch, (ICh).
Since the seller knows his type, the constraints of the buyer’s optimization problem are
not affected by the presence of ambiguity in this environment. This, and the fact that the
buyer’s objective is weakly decreasing in pl and ph, implies that the solution to the buyer’s
optimization problem satisfies the following well established properties (see for example
Salanie, 1997, Chapter 2):
1. PCh is binding: ph = αhch.
1The setting corresponds to a classic principal-agent problem with hidden information and an ambiguity-
averse principal. The restriction to truthful direct-revelation mechanisms is without loss of generality. To
see that the revelation principle applies, note that the seller faces no uncertainty and is a standard subjective
expected utility maximizer. The proof of the revelation principle in this setting is thus equivalent to the
proof for standard Bayesian Nash Implementation.
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2. ICl is binding: pl = αhch + (αl − αh)cl.
3. PCl and ICh are slack.
4. αl = 1.
Properties (1)-(3) state that the high-type seller receives his outside option, while the low-
type seller obtains a positive information rent. Property (4) is a standard ’no distortion at
the top’ result. With these properties, the menu of contracts is completely characterized
by the exchange probability of the high-quality good. For notational convenience, let this
probability be denoted by α:
{(αl, pl), (αh, ph)} = {(1, αch + (1− α)cl), (α, αch)}.
Note that there are two alternative interpretations of the basic model. In the interpretation
followed throughout the paper, the good is indivisible and α is a lottery, determining the
ex-ante probability of trade. In an alternative interpretation, the seller possesses one unit of
a perfectly divisible good, utility functions are multiplicatively linear, and α is a quantity.
Under this interpretation, the menu is a non-linear pricing schedule with a quantity discount.
Low quality is traded in large quantity at a low price, while high quality is traded in small
quantity at a high price.
Optimization Problem: Given the properties stated above, the buyer’s objective can
be stated as a function of α. The buyer’s expected utility under single prior σ is given by
Eσ[pib] = σα(vh − ch) + (1− σ)(vl − αch − (1− α)cl).
The buyer’s optimization problem is consequently
max
α
min
σ∈Σ
{σα(vh − ch) + (1− σ)(vl − αch + (1− α)cl)} .
To derive the solution to this problem, consider first the case in which Σ is a singleton and the
buyer is a subjective expected utility maximizer with single prior σ. Samuelson (1984) shows
that the buyer’s optimal contract is a first-and-final price, which the seller either accepts or
rejects. In the two-type setting this result can easily be seen by considering the buyer’s
objective. Since Eσ[pib] is linear in α, the optimization problem has a corner solution. α = 0
corresponds to offering a price equal to cl and yields expected utility (1− σ)(vl − cl), while
α = 1 corresponds to offering a price equal to ch and yields expected utility σvh+(1−σ)vl−ch.
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Pooling is optimal if and only if the probability that the seller’s type is high is large enough,
which is the case if
σ ≥ ch − cl
vh − cl .
Under ambiguity and maxmin preferences, Samuelson’s result turns out to fail. Proposition
1.2.1 shows that if Σ is not a singleton, the buyer’s optimal contract is a posted price if and
only if this price is optimal under all probability distributions in Σ. Otherwise, the buyer
optimally offers a menu.
Proposition 1.2.1. Let σ˜ := ch−cl
vh−cl and α˜ :=
vl−cl
vh−cl . The optimal menu of contracts is
{(1, α∗ch + (1− α∗)cl), (α∗, α∗ch)} with
α∗ =

0 if σ ≤ σ˜,
1 if σ ≥ σ˜,
α˜ otherwise.
Proof See Appendix 1.7.1.
σ˜ is the subjective prior under which the buyer is indifferent between all α ∈ [0, 1]. If σ ≥ σ˜
(σ ≤ σ˜), the contract that maximizes the buyer’s expected utility is a posted price equal to
ch (cl) for all σ ∈ Σ. Ambiguity aversion thus affects the buyer’s utility but not her choice
of contract. If σ < σ˜ < σ, the buyer optimally proposes a menu, characterized by α˜. α˜ is
the contracting parameter for which the buyer’s ex-post expected payoff is constant across
quality, i.e.
α˜(vh − ch) = vl − α˜ch − (1− α˜)cl.
The menu characterized by α˜ makes the buyer’s payoff independent of the type distribu-
tion and yields a ”safe payoff” equal to (vh−ch)(vl−cl)
vh−cl . Offering a screening menu thus hedges
against ambiguity. Hedging is optimal if and only if Σ is large enough, i.e. if and only if the
environment is sufficiently ambiguous.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. Under the assumption σ < σ˜ < σ, the expected utility
of a buyer with subjective prior σ is downward sloping in α (solid line), while the expected
utility of a buyer with subjective prior σ is upward sloping in α (dashed line). All expected
utility functions Eσ[pib], σ ∈ (σ, σ) lie in between these two benchmarks and intersect at α˜.
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Figure 1.1: Eσ[pib] for σ ∈ [σ, σ]
For any α < α˜, the worst-case probability distribution in Σ is σ, while for any α > α˜, the
worst-case probability distribution is σ. Since Eσ[pib] is upward sloping in α and Eσ[pib] is
downward sloping in α, the buyer’s maxmin payoff is maximized at α˜.
1.2.1 Ambiguity Aversion vs. Risk Aversion
An important question is whether the behavioral implications of ambiguity aversion in this
contracting problem differ from those of risk aversion. It is well known that if utility func-
tions are not restricted to be linear, screening can arise in equilibrium, even when there is no
ambiguity. Given the long-standing debate on the observability of ambiguity aversion (see
for example Bayer et al., 2013, and references therein), the question arises how screening
that is driven by an ambiguity hedging motive can be distinguished from screening in the
standard model. This section demonstrates that a key difference between the two models is
how the relative gains from trade affect the equilibrium contract. Along these lines, a simple
comparative statics exercise shows how ambiguity aversion can be distinguished from risk
aversion in this contracting problem.
More concretely, this section compares the properties of the equilibrium contract in two
alternative settings. The first setting corresponds to the basic model analyzed in the previous
section, where the buyer is risk-neutral and ambiguity-averse. The second specification is
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equivalent to the first, apart from the buyer’s objective. The buyer in the alternative model
is Bayesian and risk-averse. Her utility from purchasing the good, u(i, p), depends on the
good’s quality i ∈ {l, h} and the good’s price p, and has the following properties:
• Risk aversion: u2(i, p) < 0, u22(i, p) < 0, i = l, h.
• Certain gains from trade: u(i, ci) > 0, i = l, h
• Common values: u(h, p) > u(l, p),∀p.
Special cases of this general utility function are for example u(i, p) = vi−g(p), where g′(·) > 0
and g′′(·) > 0 (additive separability), or u(i, p) = υ(vi − p), where υ′(·) > 0 and υ′′(·) < 0.
The outside option of not trading is normalized to zero.
The buyer maximizes her expected utility subject to the participation and incentive
constraints of the seller. The set of constraints is equivalent to the one in the basic model,
implying that ph = αch and pl = αch + (1 − α)cl. As noted before, ph can be seen as an
expected price: the buyer pays price ch with probability α and zero otherwise. The buyer
thus solves
max
α
σαu(h, ch) + (1− σ)u(l, αch + (1− α)cl).
The first-order condition to this optimization problem is given by
σu(h, ch) = −(1− σ)u2(l, αch + (1− α)cl)(ch − cl).
The first-order condition shows the classic tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction.
The left-hand side corresponds to the marginal benefit from increasing α, the additional
gains from trade of the high quality good. The right-hand side corresponds to the marginal
cost from increasing α, the additional information rent paid to the low-type seller. The
marginal benefit is constant in α, while the marginal cost is increasing in α. Thus, if
σu(h, ch) > −(1− σ)u2(l, cl)(ch − cl) and σu(h, ch) < −(1− σ)u2(l, ch)(ch − cl), the buyer’s
problem has an interior solution and the optimal contract is a menu rather than a posted
price.
Screening under risk aversion can be distinguished from screening under ambiguity aver-
sion through a simple comparative statics exercise. Consider an increase in the buyer’s
valuation of the high-quality good. Under risk aversion, this increase leads to an increase
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in the optimal contracting parameter α∗: an increase in the buyer’s valuation of the high-
quality good corresponds to an increase in u(h, ch), raising the marginal benefit of increasing
α and thereby distorting the tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction. Trading the
high-quality good becomes more attractive, leading to an increase in the optimal contracting
parameter α∗. This can easily be seen from the first-order condition above.
In the case of ambiguity aversion, the analysis of the optimal contract showed that the
optimal contracting parameter is given by α˜ = vl−cl
vh−cl , provided that σ < σ˜ < σ. An increase
in the buyer’s valuation of the high-quality good corresponds to an increase in vh. Since α˜ is
decreasing in vh, it follows immediately that an increase in the buyer’s valuation of the high-
quality good leads to a decrease in the optimal contracting parameter α∗. The intuition is
as follows. The contracting parameter α˜ balances the buyer’s ex-post expected payoff across
quality and thereby hedges against ambiguity over the quality distribution. As vh increases,
the buyer’s expected payoff conditional on quality being high, α(vh − ch), increases, while
the buyer’s expected payoff conditional on quality being low, vl − αch − (1 − α)cl, remains
unchanged. In order to re-balance these expected payoffs, the buyer reduces the probability
of trade with the high-quality seller which in turn reduces the information rent paid to the
low type seller. Observation 1.2.2 summarizes this result.2
Observation 1.2.2. Let α∗ denote the buyer’s optimal contracting parameter.
• If the buyer is risk-averse and ambiguity-neutral, α∗ is weakly increases in the buyer’s
valuation of the high-quality good.
• If the buyer is risk-neutral and ambiguity-averse, α∗ is weakly decreases in the buyer’s
valuation of the high-quality good.
Observation 1.2.2 thus demonstrates that even if ambiguity aversion is not directly ob-
servable through the equilibrium contract, a simple comparative statics exercise can resolve
the question of whether screening is driven by the well-known tradeoff between efficiency
and rent extraction or by the buyer’s desire to hedge against ambiguity.
2The comparative statics effect under ambiguity aversion illustrates a more general property of choice
under maxmin expected utility. In recent work, Ghili and Klibanoff (2014) propose a monotonicity axiom,
and show that Ellsberg behavior under maxmin expected utility preferences is incompatible with this axiom.
The axiom, called ’Monotonicity in Mixtures’, roughly states that if an act is replaced by a dominating act,
it is optimal to mix more towards the dominant act. The trading probability α in this framework can be
re-interpreted as a randomizing probability between offering price ch and offering price cl. The comparative
statics exercise considered increases the payoff associated to offering ch but leads to a decrease in the optimal
probability with which ch is offered, a violation of ’Monotonicity in Mixtures’.
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1.3 Ambiguity and Trade
This section addresses the question of how the presence of ambiguity affects the level of
trade. In the maxmin expected utility model, the extent of ambiguity the buyer perceives is
captured by the size of the interval Σ. Since valuations in the proposed contracting problem
are perfectly correlated, an expansion of this interval corresponds to both an increase in am-
biguity over the seller’s valuation and an increase in ambiguity over the buyer’s valuation.
In order to separate the two effects, this section first considers a benchmark model in which
the buyer faces ambiguity over both the seller’s valuation and her own valuation, but where
these valuations are independent. This model shows that more ambiguity over the seller’s
valuation leads to weakly more trade, whereas more ambiguity over the buyer’s valuation
leads to weakly less trade. We will then return to the basic model with perfect correlation
and show under which conditions one effect outweighs the other.
In the model with independent valuations, the buyer’s set of prior probabilities is given
by Σ = [σs, σs] × [σb, σb], where σs (σb) denotes the probability with which the seller’s
(buyer’s) valuation is high. The extent of ambiguity over the seller’s valuation is captured
by the interval [σs, σs], while the extent of ambiguity over the buyer’s valuation is captured
by the interval [σb, σb]. Due to the independence of valuations, the worst-case probability
distribution in Σ does not depend on the buyer’s contract choice. To see this, consider the
buyer’s single prior payoff
Eσs,σb [pib] = σsα(σbvh + (1− σb)vl − ch) + (1− σs)(σbvh + (1− σb)vl − αch − (1− α)cl),
with
∂Eσs,σb [pib]
∂σs
= −(1− α)(σbvh + (1− σb)vl − cl) ≤ 0,
∂Eσs,σb [pib]
∂σb
= (1− σs + σsα)(vh − vl) ≥ 0.
Eσs,σb [pib] is weakly decreasing in σs and weakly increasing in σb, for any α ∈ [0, 1]. This
implies that the minimizing probability in Σ is generally given by {σs, σb}, the probability
distribution with maximal weight on the high-type seller and low-type buyer. The buyer’s
optimization problem under ambiguity thus corresponds to a standard optimization problem
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under a single subjective prior {σs, σb} and is given by
max
α
ΠMEU = σsα(σbvh + (1− σb)vl − ch) + (1− σs)(σbvh + (1− σb)vl − αch − (1− α)cl).
Samuelson’s (1984) result applies and the problem has a corner solution. The optimal con-
tract is characterized by
α∗ =
{
0 if σs <
ch−cl
σbvh+(1−σb)vl−cl ,
1 if σs ≥ ch−clσbvh+(1−σb)vl−cl .
Ambiguity over the buyer’s valuation: Consider first an increase in the extent of
ambiguity the buyer faces over her own valuation by considering an expansion of the interval
[σb, σb]. Let [σb, σb] ⊂ [σ′b, σ′b], or equivalently σ′b ≤ σb and σ′b ≥ σb. Since
ch − cl
σbvh + (1− σb)vl − cl
<
ch − cl
σ′bvh + (1− σ′b)vl − cl
,
an increase in ambiguity over the buyer’s valuation reduces the range of parameter values
under which pooling is optimal. This implies that whenever the buyer does not offer the
pooling price under [σb, σb], she does not either under [σ
′
b, σ
′
b]. More ambiguity over the
buyer’s valuation thus leads to weakly less trade. The intuition is that the buyer’s aversion
to ambiguity over her own valuation implies that the buyer overweighs the probability with
which her valuation is low. This diminishes the buyer’s perceived gains from trade and thus
has a negative effect on trade.
Ambiguity over the seller’s valuation: Similarly, consider an increase in the degree
of ambiguity over the seller’s valuation by considering an expansion of the interval [σs, σs].
Let [σs, σs] ⊂ [σ′s, σ′s]. σ′s ≥ σs implies
σs >
ch − cl
σbvh + (1− σb)vl − cl
⇒ σ′s >
ch − cl
σ′bvh + (1− σ′b)vl − cl
.
Whenever the buyer offers the pooling price under [σs, σs], she does so under [σ
′
s, σ
′
s]. More
ambiguity over the seller’s valuation thus leads to weakly more trade. The intuition is that
the buyer’s aversion to ambiguity over the seller’s valuation leads the buyer to overweigh
the probability with which the seller’s valuation is high. Since under such beliefs pooling is
optimal, this type of ambiguity has a positive effect on trade.
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Net effect: When types are perfectly correlated as in the basic model, the seller’s and
buyer’s valuation cannot be simultaneously high and low. This implies that the worst-case
probability distribution depends on the contract the buyer offers. The previous section
showed that if the buyer offers a menu characterized by α < α˜, the minimizing probabil-
ity distribution in Σ = [σ, σ] is given by σ, corresponding to the distribution with maximal
weight on the high-quality good. On the other hand, if the buyer offers a menu characterized
by α > α˜, the minimizing probability distribution in Σ is given by σ, corresponding to the
distribution with maximal weight on the low-quality good. This implies that for low values
of α, the buyer’s aversion to ambiguity over the seller’s valuation outweighs her aversion to
ambiguity over her own valuation, whereas for large values of α, the reverse implication holds.
To see the net effect of ambiguity on trade, let α∗Σ denote the buyer’s optimal contracting
parameter under Σ = [σ, σ]. Section 1.2 showed that α∗Σ = 0 if σ < σ < σ˜, α
∗
Σ = α˜ if
σ < σ˜ < σ, and α∗Σ = 1 if σ˜ < σ < σ. An increase in the extent of ambiguity implies that
σ weakly decreases, while σ weakly increases. If the decrease in σ and the increase in σ
is sufficiently large, the condition σ < σ˜ < σ eventually becomes satisfied and the buyer’s
optimal contract is characterized by α˜. Whether an increase in ambiguity has a positive or
negative effect on trade thus depends on the initial equilibrium contract: if α∗Σ = 0, more
ambiguity leads to weakly more trade, whereas if α∗Σ = 1, more ambiguity leads to weakly less
trade. If α∗Σ = α˜, an increase in ambiguity has no effect. This is summarized in Proposition
1.3.1.
Proposition 1.3.1. Let Σ ⊂ Σ′. If σ < σ˜, then α∗Σ ≤ α∗Σ′. If σ˜ < σ, then α∗Σ ≥ α∗Σ′.
Proof See Appendix 1.7.2.
Note that σ˜ = ch−cl
vh−cl corresponds to the relative variation in the seller’s valuation across
quality, while α˜ = 1− vh−vl
vh−cl corresponds to the inverse of the relative variation in the buyer’s
valuation across quality. The variation of the seller’s valuation thus determines the sign of
the effect of ambiguity on trade, while the variation of the buyer’s valuation determines the
extent of this effect. The larger ch−cl
vh−cl is, the larger is the set of parameters for which more
ambiguity leads to more trade, reflecting the positive effect of ambiguity over the seller’s
valuation. The larger vh−vl
vh−cl is, the smaller is the contracting parameter α˜ to which the solu-
tion under increasing ambiguity jumps, reflecting the negative effect of ambiguity over the
buyer’s valuation. The net effect is positive and sizable if ch−cl
vh−cl is large and
vh−vl
vh−cl is small,
while the reverse implication holds if ch−cl
vh−cl is small and
vh−vl
vh−cl is large.
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Remark: Note that if vl = vh, the buyer’s type does not depend on the seller’s type. Un-
der this parameter restriction, the buyer only faces ambiguity over the seller’s valuation and
ambiguity always has a positive effect on trade. To see this, note that α˜ = vl−cl
vh−cl = 1 and the
worst-case probability distribution is generally given by the distribution with maximal weight
on the high-type seller, σ. The buyer’s optimization problem under maxmin preferences thus
corresponds to the optimization problem of a subjective expected utility maximizer with single
prior σ. Samuelson’s result applies and the optimal contract is a posted price. The buyer
offers cl if σ < σ˜, while she offers the pooling price ch if σ ≥ σ˜. As the extent of ambigu-
ity increases, the latter condition eventually becomes satisfied, implying that more ambiguity
leads to weakly more trade. The intuition is that offering the pooling contract yields a safe
payoff equal to the difference between the buyer’s valuation and the pooling price. The more
ambiguity the buyer faces, the more attractive the safe pooling option becomes. Thus, in the
private value case, ambiguity generally has a positive effect on trade.
1.3.1 Ambiguity in Financial Markets
The lack of transparency in financial markets has received increasing attention by regulators
and academics. Recent papers have argued that missing transparency may give rise to am-
biguity, often perceived to be harmful for trade, e.g. Easley and O’Hara (2010) and Cheng
and Zhong (2012). The previous analysis demonstrates that the effect of ambiguity on trade
may itself be ambiguous and provides conditions under which ambiguity improves the trading
outcome. In the context of financial markets this suggests that if trade is bilateral, as in OTC
markets, opacity may be beneficial for trade and may increase surplus. This section shows
that if the positive effect of ambiguity is large enough, the presence of ambiguity not only
improves the bilateral trading outcome but this outcome may even outperform a competitive
centralized market allocation. Specifically, a stylized example is constructed to demonstrate
that if the adverse selection problem is sufficiently severe, bilateral exchange implements a
more efficient allocation than centralized markets if and only if there is sufficient ambiguity.
This result highlights a new aspect in the recent debate on why a large class of assets is pre-
dominantly traded over the counter rather than on traditional exchanges (see for example
Malamud and Rostek (2013) and the references therein) and why opacity plays a critical role.
Suppose there is an equal measure of buyers and sellers that can either be matched
bilaterally or trade in a centralized market a` la Akerlof. In the first setting, we abstract
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from possible matching frictions and assume that each buyer meets exactly one seller.3 In
the second setting, assets are exchanged competitively at a market clearing price.4 As in the
basic model, sellers are endowed with one unit of an asset and have private information about
its quality. At the market clearing price, buyers face no ambiguity over their probability of
trade but only over their valuation of the asset. Ambiguity in a competitive market with
adverse selection thus generally has a negative effect on trade. The worst-case probabilistic
scenario for a buyer is given by the distribution under which the probability of buying low
quality is maximal, σ. The behavior of ambiguity-averse buyers in this market is consequently
equivalent to that of subjective expected utility maximizers with a single prior σ. Trade of
the high-quality asset is feasible if and only if the high-type seller’s valuation does not exceed
the buyer expected valuation evaluated at σ, i.e.
ch ≤ σvh + (1− σ)vl.
If this inequality is not satisfied, trade of the high-quality asset is precluded. Note that
the larger the extent of ambiguity is, the smaller is σ and the more likely it is that only
low quality can be traded. Ambiguity thus exacerbates the adverse selection problem in a
competitive market a` la Akerlof.
Now consider the case in which buyers and seller are matched bilaterally. Assume that
the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer as in Section 1.2, which the seller accepts or rejects,
and consider the following condition:
σ <
ch − vl
vh − vl <
ch − cl
vh − cl︸ ︷︷ ︸
=σ˜
< σ.
The first inequality is equivalent to ch > σvh + (1− σ)vl, which precludes trade of the high-
quality asset in the centralized market. The second inequality follows from cl < vl, and the
third inequality together with the first implies that the optimal contract under bilateral trade
is characterized by α˜.5 Since α˜ > 0, the above condition implies that the high-quality asset
3In reality, matching frictions are relevant of course. The following results and statements hold as long
as these frictions are sufficiently small.
4This implicitly assumes that trade is non-exclusive, a natural assumption in the context of financial
markets. Non-exclusivity implies that competitive screening a` la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) cannot be
sustained in equilibrium.
5The basic model assumes that the good is indivisible and that α˜ is a probability. As noted before, there
is an alternative interpretation in which the good is perfectly divisible and α˜ is a quantity. The optimal
contract can then be interpreted as a non-linear pricing schedule with quantity discounts. This type of
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is traded with positive probability under bilateral contracting but not in the competitive
market. Since the condition requires σ < σ, the argument crucially relies on the presence of
ambiguity, and suggests that if traders have sufficiently ambiguous beliefs about the funda-
mentals, decentralized trade may yield strictly more surplus than traditional exchanges.
Suppose now that regulators had means to reduce the extent of ambiguity traders face,
e.g. through transparency mandating policies. In particular, assume that there is an ob-
jective probability that quality is high, σˆ ∈ Σ, that can be credibly revealed to traders.
If ch > σˆvh + (1 − σˆ)vl and σˆ is disclosed, trade of the high-quality asset is precluded in
the centralized market and strictly sub-optimal under bilateral contracting. If, on the other
hand, σˆ is not disclosed and traders have ambiguous beliefs, optimal contracting in bilat-
eral meetings implements trade of the high-quality asset with positive probability as long as
σ > σ˜. This suggests that if the adverse-selection problem is sufficiently severe, the presence
of ambiguity may be essential for high-quality assets to be traded. Presuming that trans-
parency mandating policies reduce the extent of ambiguity traders face, this demonstrates
a new effect of opacity on financial market outcomes, adding to a recent literature on the
welfare effects of opaque trading, e.g. Di Maggio and Pagano (2014) and Pancs (2014).6
1.4 Smooth Ambiguity Aversion
For a given set of measures, the maxmin expected utility model may be seen as a special
case of the smooth ambiguity model with infinite ambiguity aversion. The smooth ambiguity
model, developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005), not only has very robust features but also
allows for a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. This section extends the
characterization of the optimal contract to the case of smooth ambiguity aversion and shows
how the properties of the solution are connected to the optimal contract under maxmin
expected utility. The buyer’s utility function is given by
ΠSM = Eµ [Φ (Eσ[pib])] ,
non-linear pricing is indeed commonly observed in OTC markets, for example in the form of dealers posting
quotes which only hold for small quantities. The exchange of larger quantities is negotiated directly between
dealers and traders and typically executed at a lower price (Jankowitsch et al., 2011).
6In these papers, decision makers are subjective expected utility maximizers and more transparency
provides more information rather than less ambiguity. Both papers show that opaque trading may be
efficient.
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where µ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a subjective prior on a set of probability measures and Φ : R→ R
is a function that weighs different realizations of the decision maker’s expected utility Eσ[pib].
Ambiguity is captured by the second-order belief µ, which measures the buyer’s belief about
a particular σ being the ”correct” probability distribution. Ambiguity attitude is captured
by the function Φ. If Φ is linear, the buyer is ambiguity neutral and her preferences are ob-
servationally equivalent to those of a subjective expected utility maximizer. If, on the other
hand, Φ is concave, the buyer is ambiguity-averse and prefers known risks over unknown
risks. The degree of ambiguity aversion is measured by the coefficient of absolute ambiguity
aversion −Φ′′(x)
Φ′(x) .
7
As in the basic model, the buyer proposes a menu of the form {(1, αch+(1−α)cl), (α, αch)}.
The optimization problem is given by
max
α
Eµ [Φ (σα(vh − ch) + (1− σ)(vl − αch − (1− α)cl))] .
To make ambiguity matter assume that µ has positive mass on both [0, σ˜] and [σ˜, 1] and
assume that Φ′(·) > 0,Φ′′(·) < 0. The first order condition to the buyer’s optimization
problem is given by
Eµ [Φ
′ (Eσ[pib(α)]) (σ˜ − σ)|σ < σ˜]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡MC(α)
= Eµ [Φ
′ (Eσ[pib(α)]) (σ − σ˜)|σ > σ˜]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡MG(α)
.
The marginal cost of increasing α, MC(α), is the marginal decrease in expected utility in
the probabilistic scenario that pooling is not optimal (σ < σ˜), while the marginal gain of
increasing α, MG(α), is the marginal increase in expected utility in the probabilistic scenario
that pooling is optimal (σ > σ˜). Concavity of Φ implies that the marginal cost is increasing
in α, whereas the marginal gain is decreasing in α. This implies that there is a unique α
that maximizes the buyer’s expected payoff. The conditions for an interior solution are
MC(0) < MG(0) and MC(1) > MG(1).
7−Φ′′(x)Φ′(x) measures aversion to subjective uncertainty about ex-ante payoffs. Analogous to risk aversion,
Klibanoff et al. (2005) define ambiguity aversion as an aversion to mean preserving spreads in the subjective
probability distribution over the set of expected utility values.
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Proposition 1.4.1 summarizes this result.
Proposition 1.4.1. The optimal menu of contracts for a buyer with smooth ambiguity aver-
sion is {(1, α∗ch + (1− α∗)cl), (α∗, α∗ch)} with
α∗ =

0 if MC(0) ≥MG(0),
1 if MC(1) ≤MG(1),
s.th. MC(α∗) = MG(α∗) otherwise.
Proposition 1.4.1 is the smooth counterpart of the equilibrium characterization under
maxmin expected utility in Section 1.2. To see the connection between the two models,
assume that absolute ambiguity aversion is constant, i.e. −Φ′′(x)
Φ′(x) = γ.
8 Assume further that
the support of µ is Σ and that σ < σ˜ < σ.9 Under maxmin preferences, the buyer’s optimal
contract, characterized by α˜, makes her payoff unambiguous. Under smooth ambiguity
aversion, the buyer compromises between maximizing the second-order expectation of her
expected utility, EµEσ[pib], and limiting her exposure to ambiguity. EµEσ[pib] is maximized by
offering a posted price (either equal to cl or ch), whereas ambiguity is eliminated by offering
the menu characterized by α˜. The optimal contract under smooth ambiguity aversion is a
convex combination of the two. If offering the pooling price maximizes EµEσ[pib], then the
optimal contracting parameter α∗ lies in the interval [α˜, 1], otherwise α∗ lies in the interval
[0, α˜]. The more ambiguity-averse the buyer is, the closer is α∗ to α˜. This is summarized in
Proposition 1.4.2.
Proposition 1.4.2. Assume −Φ′′(x)
Φ′(x) = γ.
• If Eµ[σ] < σ˜, then α∗ ∈ [0, α˜] and dα∗dγ ≥ 0.
• If Eµ[σ] > σ˜, then α∗ ∈ [α˜, 1] and dα∗dγ ≤ 0.
Proof See Appendix 1.7.3.
Proposition 1.4.2 is illustrated in Figure 2. The figure shows the optimal contracting param-
eter α∗ as a function of σ˜ for different degrees of ambiguity aversion, parameterized by γ.
The solid curve represents the optimal contract under ambiguity neutrality (γ = 0), while
the dashed curve represents the optimal contract under maxmin expected utility (γ →∞).
The curves in between these two benchmarks show the optimal contracting parameter under
8Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that under this assumption the maxmin expected utility model is a limiting
case of the smooth ambiguity model.
9Otherwise the solution is the same posted price under both representations.
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Figure 1.2: α∗ for different levels of γ.
smooth ambiguity aversion with intermediate values of γ. If σ˜ < σ (σ˜ > σ), ambiguity is
irrelevant and the optimal contract is characterized by α∗ = 1 (α∗ = 0). If, on the other
hand, σ˜ ∈ [σ,Eµ[σ]] (σ˜ ∈ [Eµ[σ], σ]), the optimal contract under ambiguity neutrality is a
price equal to ch (cl), whereas the optimal contract under maxmin expected utility is a menu
characterized by α˜. For intermediate values of γ, the solution of the buyer’s optimization
problem lies in between these two benchmarks. As γ increases, the optimal contracting
parameter under smooth ambiguity aversion approaches the maxmin solution α˜.
1.5 Continuous Types
This section extends the results derived in the two-type setting to a model with a continuum
of types. The seller’s valuation c is distributed on the interval [0, 1] and the buyer’s valuation
v is a function of the seller’s valuation. To facilitate the exposition, assume that gains from
trade are constant across types: v(c) = c+ ∆,∆ > 0.10
10An online appendix available on my homepage, https://sites.google.com/site/austersarah/, extends the
analysis to general linear valuation functions.
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Ambiguity: The buyer considers multiple probability distribution functions on [0, 1]
possible. The set of probability measures, denoted by F , is defined by the set of all dis-
tribution functions that have some minimal mass gc on each type c ∈ [0, 1]. Working with
this general set of priors is complicated, because the extent of ambiguity is determined by
an infinite set of parameters gc, c ∈ [0, 1]. To make the analysis tractable, I assume that the
extent of ambiguity is symmetric across types, i.e. gc = g,∀c:
F =
{
P ∈ P : P [B] ≥
∫
B
gdt,∀B ∈ B[0, 1]
}
, g ∈ [0, 1],
where P is the set of all probability distribution functions on [0, 1] and B[0, 1] is the Borel
σ-algebra of the set [0, 1]. Note that the symmetric structure on the set of measures does
not imply that the distribution functions in the set are symmetric: within bound g, f ∈ Fg
can be arbitrarily skewed to the right or to the left. The advantage of this structure is that
the extent of ambiguity is captured by a single parameter g, where a larger g corresponds
to a smaller set of probability distributions: Fg′ ⊂ Fg, g′ > g. If g = 0, Fg contains every
possible distribution function on [0, 1], while if g = 1, there is no ambiguity and the unique
probability distribution in Fg is the uniform distribution on [0, 1].
Contract: The optimal contract is characterized by a trading probability α(c) and a
price p(c) for each c ∈ [0, 1]. The participation and incentive constraints in this setting are
p(c)− α(c)c ≥ 0, ∀c,
p(c)− α(c)c ≥ p(c˜)− α(c˜)c, ∀c, c˜,
which corresponds to the set of constraints in Samuelson (1984). Given that the seller
truthfully reveals, the buyer’s and seller’s ex-post expected payoffs are given by
pib(c) = α(c)v(c)− p(c) and pis(c) = p(c)− α(c)c,
respectively. Samuelson (1984, p. 997) shows that the set of constraints implies α′(c) ≤ 0
and pi′s(c) = −α(c). With these properties, the buyer’s and seller’s payoffs can be derived as
a function of α(c) only. pi′s(c) = −α(c) together with pis(1) = 0 yields
pis(c) =
∫ 1
c
α(u)du.
22 CHAPTER 1.∫ 1
c
α(u)du corresponds to the information rent paid to type c. The buyer’s ex-post expected
payoff is the difference between the expected gains from trade and the information rent paid
to the seller, i.e.
pib(c) = α(c)∆−
∫ 1
c
α(u)du.
Optimization Problem: The buyer solves
max
α(c)
ΠMEU = min
f∈Fg
∫ 1
0
(
α(c)∆−
∫ 1
c
α(u)du
)
f(c)dc, s.t. α′(c) ≤ 0.
The main challenge in finding the solution to this problem is to identify the minimizing prob-
ability distribution in Fg for each function α(c) that satisfies the monotonicity constraint.
The structure imposed on Fg makes this task tractable: The set of minimizing distributions,
given α(c), is the set of distribution functions with maximal mass on any type that yields
the lowest expected payoff for the buyer. This set contains every distribution function with
a mass point 1 − g on some minimizing type and density g on the rest of the type space.
The buyer’s payoff is consequently
ΠMEU = g
∫ 1
0
pib(c)dc+ (1− g) min
c∈[0,1]
pib(c).
This payoff is the weighted sum of the buyer’s expected utility with a single uniform prior
and the buyer’s maxmin payoff under complete ambiguity.11 Before presenting the full char-
acterization of the contract that maximizes this objective, some intuition can be gained by
considering the two extreme cases g = 1 (no ambiguity) and g = 0 (maximal ambiguity).
If g = 1, the buyer is a standard subjective expected utility maximizer and the optimal
contract is a posted price (Samuelson, 1984). To see this, consider the buyer’s payoff under
11Note that this payoff function represents a well-established parametric ambiguity model, the ε-
contamination model axiomatized by Kopylov (2009). In this model, the decision maker holds a subjective
probabilistic opinion, here the uniform distribution, but likes to hedge against the case that it turns out to
be false. ε(= 1− g) parameterizes the decision maker’s subjective willingness to hedge.
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a single uniform prior:12∫ 1
0
pib(c)dc =
∫ 1
0
(
α(c)∆dc−
∫ 1
c
α(u)du
)
dc =
∫ 1
0
α(c)(∆− c)dc.
This payoff is maximized by the contract
αNA(c) =
{
1 if c ≤ ∆,
0 if c > ∆,
which corresponds to a posted price p∗ = ∆.
If g = 0, Fg contains every possible probability distribution on [0, 1] and the buyer’s
payoff is given by minc∈[0,1] pib(c). The contract that maximizes this payoff is a contract
under which pib(c) is constant across types (see Proposition 1.5.1):
pi′b(c) = 0 ⇐⇒ α′(c)∆ = α(c).
The solution to this differential equation, together with α(0) = 1, is
αMA(c) = e−
c
∆ ,
a decreasing function of c that perfectly separates all types. The contract characterized by
αMA is a screening menu that makes the buyer indifferent between all types and thereby
indifferent between all distributions over types. A decreasing function α(c) allows the buyer
to balances her rent across types by exactly offsetting the increased information rent paid
to lower types by the increased trading probability with these types. αMA therefore hedges
perfectly against the ambiguity in this contracting problem and can be seen as the continu-
ous analogue of α˜ in the binary type environment of Section 1.2.
For intermediate levels of ambiguity, the optimal contract compromises between maximiz-
ing the buyer’s expected utility under a single uniform prior,
∫ 1
0
α(c)(∆− c)dc, and limiting
her worst-case payoff, minc pib(c). The ambiguity parameter g weighs these two objectives.
12The second equality can be derived by changing the order of integration:∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c
α(u)dudc =
∫ 1
0
∫ u
0
α(u)dcdu =
∫ 1
0
α(u)udu.
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Proposition 1.5.1 characterizes the buyer’s optimal contract for all g ∈ [0, 1]. It shows that
for intermediate levels of ambiguity the optimal contract exhibits partial bunching and par-
tial separation, where the extent of separation increases in the extent of ambiguity the buyer
faces.
Proposition 1.5.1. Assume v(c) = c+ ∆ and F = Fg for some g ∈ [0, 1].
• Perfect Separation: if g ≤ 1
∆
e−
1
∆ ,
α∗(c) = e−
c
∆ ,∀c.
• Partial Separation: if g ∈
(
1
∆
e−
1
∆ , 1
∆
e−
1−∆
∆
)
,
α∗(c) =
{
1 if c ≤ cˆ,
∆−cˆ
∆
e−
c−cˆ
∆ if c > cˆ,
where cˆ = 1 + ∆ ln(g∆).
• Posted Price: if g ≥ 1
∆
e−
1−∆
∆ ,
α∗(c) =
{
1 if c ≤ ∆,
0 if c > ∆.
Proof See Appendix 1.7.4.
There are three regions to be distinguished. First, if the extent of ambiguity is suffi-
ciently small
(
g ≥ 1
∆
e−
1−∆
∆
)
, the buyer proposes αNA, the optimal contract in the absence
of ambiguity (g = 1). Under αNA, the buyer’s expected utility under a single uniform prior
is maximized, while the buyer’s worst-case payoff is equal to zero. Second, if the extent of
ambiguity is sufficiently large
(
g ≤ 1
∆
e−
1
∆
)
, the buyer proposes αMA, the optimal contract
under maximal ambiguity (g = 0). By definition of αMA, all types yield the same expected
ex-post payoff, equal to
Π = pib(1) = ∆α
MA(1) = ∆e−
1
∆ .
Finally, for intermediate levels of ambiguity, the buyer faces a tradeoff between maximizing
her expected utility under a single uniform prior and limiting her minimal payoff. She solves
this tradeoff by partially separating types. In particular, there is a separating region, (cˆ, 1],
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Figure 1.3: α∗(c) and pib(c) for different values of g ∈ [0, 1]
in which α(c) is strictly decreasing in c and pib(c) is constant across types. The rest of the
types, [0, cˆ], are bunched and trade with probability one. The larger the buyer’s desired level
of minc pib(c) is, the smaller is the bunching region [0, cˆ].
To see this, consider the optimal contract in the absence of ambiguity, αNA. If the buyer
wishes to raise her minimal payoff, she needs to raise α(c) for all c ∈ (∆, 1]. This implies
that the information rent paid to types c ∈ [0,∆] increases, which consequently implies that
the buyer’s ex-post expected payoff when trading with the lowest type is negative:
pib(0) = ∆−
∫ ∆
0
1du−
∫ 1
∆
α(c)du < 0.
To increase pib(0), the buyer needs to decrease the information rent paid to the lowest type.
This is optimally done by shrinking the bunching region [0, cˆ] and by keeping pib(c) constant
across the remaining types, c ∈ (cˆ, 1]. The buyer’s ex-post expected payoff is minimal either
when trading with the lowest type or when trading with any type in (cˆ, 1]. The more the
buyer wishes to raise her minimal payoff, the smaller the bunching region [0, cˆ] becomes,
illustrated in Figure 3. The optimal size of [0, cˆ] is determined by the ambiguity parameter
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g (see Proposition 1.5.1):
cˆ = 1 + ∆ ln(g∆).
The marginal type cˆ is increasing in g. Since g is the inverse measure of the extent of
ambiguity in this environment, this implies that the degree of separation in equilibrium
increases in the extent of ambiguity the buyer faces. The intuition is that bunching maximizes
the buyer’s subjective expected utility while separation allows the buyer to hedge against
ambiguity. The more ambiguity the buyer faces, the more profitable hedging becomes.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the implications of ambiguity aversion on optimal contracting with
asymmetric information and common values. It shows how non-linear pricing hedges against
ambiguity over the valuations of the contracting parties and provides conditions under which
the optimal contract under ambiguity differs from the optimal contract under any single prior.
Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that ambiguity does not necessarily inhibit trade, a
rather surprising result given the previous literature on ambiguity and trade, e.g. Dow and
Werlang (1992), De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011), etc. The paper provides conditions
under which ambiguity has a positive effect on trade and shows that under further restric-
tions, the trading outcome under bilateral negotiations and ambiguity may be strictly more
efficient than in competitive markets. In the context of financial markets, this suggests that
if opacity gives rise to ambiguity, opaque OTC markets may implement strictly better trad-
ing outcomes than traditional exchange markets, and thereby highlights a new aspect in the
debate on why opaque off-exchange trading may emerge.
An interesting question for future research is how the results derived in this paper extend
to trading environments with more than two contracting parties. One promising approach
is to consider ambiguity in auction settings with interdependent values. In interdependent
value auctions, bidders compete for a good of uncertain value and receive private signals,
determining each other’s valuations. If bidders have ambiguous beliefs about the signal
distribution, they face ambiguity over both their valuation of the good and their probability
to win, and are thus confronted with a decision problem akin to the one presented in this
paper. The results of this work suggest that if the bidders’ aversion to ambiguity over the
probability to win outweighs their aversion to ambiguity over their valuation of the object,
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the presence of ambiguity may lead to strictly higher bids, thereby benefiting the auctioneer.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Proof of Proposition 1.2.1
The buyer maximizes minσ∈Σ Eσ[pib]. To identify the minimizing prior, consider
∂Eσ[pib]
∂σ
= α(vh − cl)− (vl − cl) ≷ 0 if α ≷ α˜.
This implies σ ∈ arg minσ∈Σ {Eσ[pib(α)]} if α ≤ α˜ and σ ∈ arg minσ∈Σ {Eσ[pib(α)]} if α ≥ α˜.
The buyer consequently maximizes the step function
ΠMEU =
{
σα(vh − ch) + (1− σ)(vl − αch + (1− α)cl) if α ≤ α˜,
σα(vh − ch) + (1− σ)(vl − αch + (1− α)cl) if α > α˜.
Note further:
∂Eσ[pib(α)]
∂α
= σ(vh − cl)− (ch − cl) ≷ 0 if σ ≷ σ˜.
If σ ≤ σ˜, both parts of the step function are weakly decreasing in α and ΠMEU is maximized
at α = 0. Similarly, if σ ≥ σ˜, both parts of the step function are weakly increasing in α and
ΠMEU is maximized at α = 1. If σ < σ˜ < σ, ΠMEU is increasing in α on the interval [0, α˜]
and decreasing in α on the interval [α˜, 1], and therefore maximized at α˜.
1.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1.3.1
Suppose σ < σ˜.
If σ˜ < σ, then α∗Σ = α˜. Since σ < σ˜ < σ implies σ
′ < σ˜ < σ′, α∗Σ′ = α˜. An increase in
ambiguity has no effect.
If σ < σ˜, then α∗Σ = 0. This implies either σ
′ < σ′ < σ˜ or σ′ < σ˜ < σ′, in which case α∗Σ′ = 0
or α∗Σ′ = α˜, respectively. Hence, α
∗
Σ ≤ α∗Σ′ .
The proof for the case σ˜ < σ is analogous.
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1.7.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4.2
Under constant absolute ambiguity aversion, we have Φ(x) = − 1
γ
e−γx.
Suppose first Eµ[σ] > σ˜. Note that EµEσ[pib(α)] increases in α and that Varµ [Eσ[pib(α)]] >
0 for all α < α˜. This implies that the expected utility distribution induced by any α < α˜ is
second-order stochastically dominated by the (degenerate) distribution induced by α˜. Since
Φ is strictly concave, this implies α∗ ∈ [α˜, 1].
The optimal value of α∗ is characterized by
Eµ
[
e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ − σ˜)] = 0,
if the solution is interior (otherwise a marginal change in γ has no effect). The implicit
function theorem implies
dα∗
dγ
= −Eµ
[
e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ − σ˜)Eσ[pi(α∗)]
]
γEµ [e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ − σ˜)2] .
dα∗
dγ
≤ 0, if the numerator is positive on the interval [α˜, 1]. Suppose not. Then
Eµ
[
e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ˜ − σ)Eσ[pi(α∗)] | σ ≤ σ˜
]
> Eµ
[
e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ − σ˜)Eσ[pi(α∗)] | σ ≥ σ˜
]
.
But
Eµ
[
e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ˜ − σ)Eσ[pi(α∗)] | σ ≤ σ˜
] ≤ Eσ˜[pi(α∗)]Eµ [e−γEσ [pi(α∗)](σ˜ − σ) | σ ≤ σ˜] ,
= Eσ˜[pi(α
∗)]Eµ
[
e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ − σ˜) | σ ≥ σ˜] ,
≤ Eµ
[
e−γEσ [pi(α
∗)](σ − σ˜)Eσ[pi(α∗)] | σ ≥ σ˜
]
,
which follows from ∂Eσ [pib(α)]
∂σ
> 0,∀α ∈ [α˜, 1]. A contradiction. Hence, dα∗
dγ
≤ 0.
The proof for the case Eµ[σ] > σ˜ is analogous, where the above inequalities are reversed.
Just note that second-order stochastic dominance implies α∗ ∈ [0, α˜] and that ∂Eσ [pib(α)]
∂σ
<
0,∀α ∈ [0, α˜].
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1.7.4 Proof of Proposition 1.5.1
The optimal contract α∗ will be derived in a series of lemmas. Let ΠNA :=
∫ 1
0
α(c)[∆− c]dc
and ΠMA := minc
{
α(c)∆− ∫ 1
c
α(u)du
}
denote the buyer’s maxmin payoff for no ambiguity
and maximal ambiguity, respectively. Further, let the set of types that yield the buyer’s
lowest expected ex-post payoff given contract α be denoted by
Cmin(α) =
{
c : c ∈ min
c˜
{
α(c˜)∆−
∫ 1
c˜
α(u)du
}}
.
The buyer solves
max
α(c)
g
∫ 1
0
α(c)(∆− c)dc+ (1− g) min
c∈[0,1]
{
α(c)∆−
∫ 1
c
α(u)du
}
s.t. α′(c) ≤ 0.
The first lemma shows that in the optimal contract, the minimal ex-post payoff is non-
negative.
Lemma 1.7.1. Assume v(c) = c + ∆ and F = Fg for some g ∈ [0, 1]. pib(c) ≥ 0, c ∈
Cmin(α∗).
Proof ΠNA is maximized by the contract
α(c) =
{
1 if c ≤ ∆,
0 if c > ∆.
The set of minimizing types given this contract is Cmin(αNA) = {0 ∪ (∆, 1]}, where pib(c) =
0,∀c ∈ Cmin(αNA). This implies that any contract α˜ with pib(c) < 0, c ∈ Cmin(α˜) is strictly
dominated by αNA. Hence, a minimizing type in the optimal contract α∗ yields a payoff that
is weakly greater than zero.
Lemma 1.7.2. Assume v(c) = c + ∆ and F = Fg for some g ∈ [0, 1]. For any p¯i ∈[
0,∆e−
1
∆
]
, there exists a strictly decreasing function αp¯i : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that αp¯i(c)∆−∫ 1
c
αp¯i(u)du = p¯i,∀c.
Proof α(c)∆− ∫ 1
c
α(u)du is constant in c if
pi′b(c) = α
′(c)∆ + α(c) = 0.
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The solution to the differential equation −α′(c)∆ = α(c) is α(c) = De− c∆ . The level of
constant ex-post payoff is equal to p¯i if pib(1) = p¯i, i.e. if
α(1)∆ = p¯i ⇒ D = p¯i
∆
e
1−c
∆ .
Consequently
αp¯i(c) =
p¯i
∆
e
1−c
∆ .
Note that αp¯i(c) is decreasing in c and thus, satisfies the monotonicity constraint. Finally,
α(c) may not exceed one for any c, which is satisfied if
αp¯i(0) ≤ 1 ⇒ p¯i ≤ ∆e− 1∆ .
Lemma 1.7.3. Assume v(c) = c + ∆ and F = Fg for some g ∈ [0, 1]. Let pi∗ = pib(c), c ∈
Cmin(α∗). Then α∗(c) ≥ αpi∗(c) for all c.
Proof Suppose not. Let c˜ be the largest type such that α∗(c) < αpi
∗
(c). Then α∗(c˜) −∫ 1
c˜
α(u)du ≥ pi∗ implies ∫ 1
c˜
α∗(u)du <
∫ 1
c˜
αpi
∗
(u)du,
a contradiction.
Lemma 1.7.4. Assume v(c) = c+∆ and F = Fg for some g ∈ [0, 1]. There exists some cˆ ∈
[0,∆] and some p¯i ∈
[
0,∆e−
1
∆
]
such that the optimal contract α∗ satisfies α∗(c) = 1,∀c ≤ cˆ
and α∗(c) = αp¯i(c),∀c < cˆ.
Proof For given minimal ex-post payoff p¯i, the buyer’s optimization problem is
max
α(c)
ΠNA s.t. α(c)∆−
∫ 1
c
α(u)du ≥ p¯i,∀c and α′(c) ≤ 0.
If p¯i = 0, the optimal contract is αNA (see the proof of Lemma 1.7.1), i.e. cˆ = ∆. If p¯i > 0,
the optimal contract given p¯i can be derived by considering a less restricted optimization
problem and then showing that the solution to this problem satisfies all constraints of the
original problem:
max
α(c)
ΠNA s.t. α(0)∆−
∫ 1
0
α(u)du ≥ p¯i and α(c) ≥ αp¯i(c),∀c.
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Let λ denote the Lagrange-multiplier of the constraint pib(0) ≥ p¯i and let µc, c ∈ [0, 1] denote
the Lagrange-multipliers of the constraints α(c) ≥ αp¯i(c). First, we can show that the
constraint pib(0) ≥ p¯i is binding. Suppose not.
∂L
∂α(c)
= ∆− c+ µc > 0 for all c < ∆,
implying that α∗(c) = 1,∀c < ∆. Then
pib(0) = ∆−
∫ ∆
0
1dc−
∫ 1
∆
α(c)dc = 0−
∫ 1
∆
α(c)dc ≤ 0,
a contradiction. The binding constraint implies that λ > 0. Let cˆ denote the type such that
∆− cˆ− λ = 0,
Since ∂L
∂α(c)
= ∆− c− λ+ µc > 0 for all c < cˆ, we have α∗(c) = 1,∀c ≤ cˆ. For the remaining
types, the constraint α(c) ≥ αp¯i(c) is binding as
∂L
∂α(c)
= ∆− c− λ+ µc = 0,
requires µc > 0 for all c > cˆ. Finally, we need to check whether this solution satisfies the
original constraints of the principal’s optimization problem, i.e. monotonicity and pib(c) ≥
p¯i,∀c. Given that αp¯i(c) is strictly decreasing, monotonicity is not violated. To see that
pib(c) ≥ p¯i,∀c, note that for c ≤ cˆ
pib(c) = ∆−
∫ cˆ
c
1dc−
∫ 1
cˆ
αp¯i(c)dc ≥ ∆−
∫ cˆ
0
1dc−
∫ 1
cˆ
α(c)dc = pib(0) = p¯i,
while for c > cˆ, pib(c) ≥ p¯i is satisfied by definition of αp¯i(c).
Lemmas 1.7.1-1.7.4 allow us to derive the optimal contract α∗. First, the minimal ex-post
payoff p¯i can be expressed as a function of cˆ:
p¯i = pib(0),
⇔ p¯i = ∆− cˆ−
∫ 1
cˆ
p¯i
∆
e
1−u
∆ du,
⇔ p¯i = ∆− cˆ+ p¯i − p¯ie 1−cˆ∆ ,
⇔ p¯i = (∆− cˆ)e− 1−cˆ∆ .
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This implies
α(c) =
{
1 if c ≤ cˆ,
∆−cˆ
∆
e−
c−cˆ
∆ if c > cˆ.
To derive the buyer’s objective as a function of cˆ note that
p(cˆ) = cˆ+
∫ 1
cˆ
∆− cˆ
∆
e−
c−cˆ
∆ = ∆− p¯i(cˆ),
where p¯i(cˆ) = (∆− cˆ)e− 1−cˆ∆ . The buyer’s optimization problem is then given by
max
cˆ
g
[
cˆ
(
1
2
cˆ+ ∆− p(cˆ)
)
+ (1− cˆ)p¯i(cˆ)
]
+ (1− g)p¯i(cˆ),
or simply
max
cˆ
1
2
gcˆ2 + p¯i(cˆ).
The first order condition to the problem is
gcˆ = −p¯i′(cˆ),
where p¯i′(cˆ) = − cˆ
∆
e−
1−cˆ
∆ . To derive the bounds for an interior solution, note that gcˆ is linearly
increasing in cˆ and −p¯i′(cˆ) is convexly increasing in cˆ:
−p¯i′′(cˆ) = e− 1−cˆ∆
(
1
∆
+
cˆ
∆2
)
> 0, −p¯i′′′(cˆ) = e− 1−cˆ∆
(
2
∆2
+
cˆ
∆3
)
> 0,
both of them intersecting at the origin. This implies that gcˆ ≥ −p¯i′(cˆ) on the interval [0,∆]
if
−p¯i′′(0) ≥ g ⇒ g ≤ 1
∆
e−
1
∆ ,
whereas gcˆ ≤ −p¯i′(cˆ) on the interval [0,∆] if
g∆ ≥ −p¯i′(∆) ⇒ g ≥ 1
∆
e−
1−∆
∆ .
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Finally, if g ∈
(
1
∆
e−
1
∆ , 1
∆
e−
1−∆
∆
)
, the problem has an interior solution. Solving the first order
condition for cˆ yields
cˆ = 1 + ln(g∆).
To see that cˆ is a maximum, note that
∂2Π
∂cˆ2
(1 + ln(g∆)) = −
(
1
∆
+ ln(g∆)
)
< 0 for all g ∈
(
1
∆
e−
1
∆ ,
1
∆
e−
1−∆
∆
)
,
making the characterization complete.
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Chapter 2
Asymmetric Awareness and Moral
Hazard
2.1 Introduction
The canonical moral hazard model analyzes the optimal contract between a principal and
an agent in the presence of privately observable effort. As in standard economic models, the
underlying assumption is that all decision makers are fully aware. That is, both the principal
and the agent know every possible outcome realization and its distribution conditional on
the agent’s effort. However, in reality there are contracting situations where one party has
a better understanding of the underlying uncertainties than the other. The question I want
to address in this paper is whether the party with superior awareness can use his better
understanding of the world strategically in the presence of moral hazard.
To illustrate this, consider the owner of a firm who wants to hire a manager. It is pos-
sible that the firm owner is aware of more opportunities and liabilities concerning his firm
than the manager. Suppose, for example, that there is the possibility that one of the firm’s
products has adverse effects on the health of consumers. As a consequence, it is possible that
the firm has to recall the product and faces severe legal liabilities. Whether the product’s
potential health threat becomes public or not is uncertain and depends on the manager’s
effort. Suppose further that the possibility of this event never crossed the manager’s mind.
The question is then, under which conditions it is profitable for the firm owner to disclose
a possible recall and its legal consequences to the manager when offering the contract. The
model shows that there is a trade off between participation and incentives. First, if the firm
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owner does not reveal the potential threat to the manager, he designs the contract such that
the manager receives the minimal payment if the recall is realized. Since the manager does
not take into account such an event, the participation constraint is less costly to satisfy.
The size of the participation effect depends on the probability of the event. If the potential
recall and its legal consequences are highly probable, it is easier to hire the manager without
disclosing the possibility of the product’s health threat. Second, since the probability of the
health threat becoming public depends on the effort of the manager, its realization is a signal
about the manager’s effort. Disclosing the potential threat makes the incentive constraint
less costly to satisfy. The size of the incentive effect depends on how much the manager’s
effort affects the probability of the event. If the manager can reduce the probability of the
potential recall significantly, it is optimal to make his payment contingent on its realization.
This paper proposes a theoretical model which introduces asymmetric awareness in the
canonical moral hazard model. The model analyzes the optimal contract between a fully
aware principal and an unaware agent. A decision maker is called unaware when there exist
contingencies that he does not know, and he does not know that he does not know, and so
on ad infinitum (Modica and Rustichini, 1994, 1999). In the proposed model, the agent is
assumed to be unaware of some relevant events, meaning that there are contingencies that
affect the agent’s payoff but that have never crossed his mind. Further, the agent is assumed
to be unaware of his unawareness, so he believes that his description of the world is correct
and complete. This implies that the agent is oblivious to the possibility that the principal is
aware of contingencies that he is unaware of. The principal, on the other hand, is assumed
to be fully aware. Moreover, the principal knows that the agent is unaware and he knows
what the agent is unaware of. When writing the contract the principal can make the agent
aware of some or all relevant contingencies. Note that a contract which transmits awareness
is distinct from a contract that transmits information. A contract carrying information gen-
erally narrows the state space of the agent, whereas a contract carrying awareness expands
the agent’s state space by adding new dimensions. Thus, the analysis of the optimization
problem of a principal with superior awareness complements the literature on moral hazard
with an informed principal (e.g. Benabou and Tirole (2003)).
The risk-neutral principal proposes a contract to the risk-averse agent. The principal is
the owner of a risky project, whose outcome is a function of the realization of a finite number
of elementary contingencies of which the agent only knows a subset. These contingencies can
be thought of as elementary propositions that can be either true or false. The probability
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of a contingency to be realized depends on the agent’s privately taken effort. The agent’s
effort can be high or low and it is assumed that implementing high effort is always optimal.
Since the principal cannot observe the agent’s action, the terms of the contract have to be
such that it is in the agent’s best interest to exert the level of effort the principal wishes to
implement. The compensation scheme is made contingent on the observable and verifiable
outcome, rewarding the agent for outcome realizations that are relatively likely under high
effort. The agent is assumed to have limited liability, thus transfers have to be non-negative
in each state of the world. If the principal leaves the agent unaware of some contingencies,
there is a non-empty set of possible outcomes that the agent does not take into account. It is
optimal for the principal to construct the contract such that the agent receives the minimal
payment whenever an unforeseen outcome is realized.
The main question this paper addresses is whether and under which conditions the prin-
cipal enlarges the agent’s awareness. The rationale for leaving the agent unaware is what
I refer to as the participation effect. If the agent is unaware, his beliefs are systematically
biased, which is exploited by the principal. The principal pays in expectation less than the
agent’s reservation utility, because there is positive probability that he pays zero and be-
cause the agent does not take this into account. The rationale for making the agent aware is
what I refer to as the incentive effect. Since the probability of a contingency to be realized
depends on the effort of the agent, including it in the contract allows the principal to use
its realization as a signal about the agent’s action choice. This implies that the information
structure is richer and providing incentives is less costly.
The principal includes contingencies in the contract for which the incentive gains out-
weighs the participation loss, determined by the distributional properties of these contingen-
cies. The participation cost of announcing a contingency is the payment to the agent in the
states where the contingency is realized. This cost increases with the probability that the
unforeseen contingency is realized. The gain of including the contingency is the richer infor-
mation structure, where this gain increases with the informativeness of the signal. Roughly
speaking, contingencies for which the incentive effect dominates the participation effect are
contingencies that are very unlikely but highly informative. The characterization of the
tradeoff between participation and incentive effect is the key contribution of this paper.
If the agent is unaware after reading the contract, his perception of the world differs
from the perception of the principal. The question arises whether the agent can rationalize
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the proposed contract given his beliefs or whether he should get suspicious. To answer this
question I analyze the principal’s optimization problem from the viewpoint of the agent.
The solution to this problem coincides with the proposed contract whenever the principal’s
expected profit evaluated at the agent’s beliefs is non-negative and the optimal effort choice
is the same for both beliefs. Given these conditions, the proposed contract is fully ratio-
nalizable for the agent, i.e. the agent has no reason to become suspicious upon reading the
contract. The reason for this is that the principal uses the signals within the agent’s aware-
ness optimally. Since the agent is unaware of the existence of other relevant contingencies,
the proposed contract maximizes the principal’s expected payoff evaluated at the agent’s
beliefs.
Next, I allow for competition among principals. In the benchmark model without un-
awareness, principals engage in a Bertrand competition over the compensation scheme. In
equilibrium, principals make zero profits and the second-best surplus goes to the agent. If the
agent is unaware, the symmetric awareness equilibrium exists but there may be other equi-
libria in which the agent stays unaware, even when competition is tight. As these equilibria
are generally inefficient, this result is rather surprising. The reason why unawareness may
persist in equilibrium is that if the agent’s perception of the world is sufficiently distorted,
principals can make ”generous” offers for outcomes within the agent’s awareness. Revealing
the unforeseen states allows the agent to adjust his action choice, exploiting the equilibrium
offer in his favor at the cost of the principals. If the agent can reduce the probability to
receive the minimal payment sufficiently, accepting the equilibrium contract may yield a
higher payoff than the second-best surplus, making any deviating contract unprofitable.
Finally, some generalizations are discussed. Throughout the main part of the analysis it
is assumed that output is a discrete one-to-one mapping from contingencies to real numbers.
I discuss how results change when more general forms of output functions are considered.
Next, the analysis abstracts from the optimal action choice. I show that whenever the prin-
cipal wishes to implement low effort, it is optimal to not reveal any contingencies, because
there is no incentive effect. Further, I extend the analysis to an environment with heteroge-
neous awareness of agents and show that unawareness is preserved in equilibrium only if the
extent of initial unawareness is large enough. Next, I discuss the optimal contract when the
agent is the residual claimant. There is an additional effect on the participation constraint
because the agent’s evaluation of the project generally depends on his level of awareness.
It is favorable to the principal to disclose negative outcome shocks, because their revelation
2.2. RELATED LITERATURE 41
lowers the agent’s outside option. Lastly, a frequently raised concern is whether unawareness
is observationally equivalent to full awareness with zero probability beliefs. I discuss in what
sense my model can be interpreted as a standard principal-agent model with heterogeneous
priors.
Section 2.2 gives an overview of the related literature. Section 2.3 introduces the the-
oretical model. In Section 2.4 the optimal contract with observable effort is characterized
as a benchmark. The main part of the paper, Section 2.5, is devoted to the analysis of the
optimal contract with unobservable effort. Section 2.6 introduces competition among prin-
cipals and Section 2.7 discusses generalizations of the basic model. Section 2.8 offers some
concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
It is not possible to incorporate non-trivial unawareness in the standard state space model.
This has been shown in the seminal paper by Dekel et al. (1998). In response, Heifetz et al.
(2006), Li (2009), Board and Chung (2011) and Galanis (2013) have proposed generalized
state space models that allow for non-trivial unawareness. My model is based on the gener-
alized state space model introduced by Heifetz et al. (2006). Their unawareness structure
consists of a lattice of state spaces, ordered according to their expressive power, where each
state space captures a particular horizon of propositions. In a companion work Heifetz et al.
(2013) introduce probabilistic beliefs to the model.
Filiz-Ozbay (2012) was one of the first to incorporate unawareness into contracting prob-
lems. She considers a contracting situation between a fully aware insurer and an unaware
insuree. The key difference between my work and her paper is the presence of moral haz-
ard and the assumption on beliefs. In Filiz-Ozbay (2012) there is no hidden action and
consequently no incentive effect. Her set up restricts my framework to the case where the
agent is the residual claimant and the revelation of new states involves a participation ef-
fect only. However, Filiz-Ozbay (2012) allows for a wider range of equilibrium beliefs. She
assumes that the agent assigns arbitrary probability beliefs to newly revealed states with
the restriction that the principal’s payoff evaluated at the agent’s beliefs is non-negative and
that relative probability beliefs previously held are unchanged. Given this assumption, it
is possible that the agent’s beliefs deviate stronger from objective probabilities when be-
coming aware than before. Due to the insurance motive and the wider range of equilibrium
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beliefs, the effect of revelation on the participation constraint in her environment is ambigu-
ous. Depending on the effect on the participation constraint, disclosure can be profitable
or not. Also Ozbay (2008) analyzes a setting where the decision maker is unaware of some
events and a fully aware announcer strategically mentions contingencies before the decision
maker takes an action. Both Filiz-Ozbay (2012) and Ozbay (2008) explore the possibility
that the unaware agent is able to reason why the other agent proposed the observed contract.
A second strand of literature analyzes contracting problems with unawareness of actions.
In these models agents are aware of all of nature’s moves but are unaware of their own
action space. Von Thadden and Zhao (2012a, 2012b) propose a moral hazard model with a
fully aware principal and an unaware agent. At first glance this set up may seem similar to
mine, however the underlying intuition and the results are very distinct. In contrast to my
model, the agent in their model understands all relevant contingencies but is unaware of his
action space. Von Thadden and Zhao (2012a) assume that if the principal leaves the agent
unaware, the agent chooses a default action unconsciously, but assesses his expected utility
with respect to such default action correctly. The principal decides whether to make the
agent aware of his action space or whether to leave him unaware. In a standard moral haz-
ard framework this can be interpreted as the decision whether to restrict the agent’s action
choice to some sub-optimal level ex-ante or whether to leave the action choice to the agent’s
discretion. Making the agent aware enlarges the agent’s action space and consequently re-
laxes the participation constraint. However, enlarging the agent’s action space adds further
incentive constraints to the principal’s optimization problem. Consequently, the principal
faces a trade off between participation and incentives, but the effects are reversed compared
to my model. Their main result is, that it is optimal to leave the agent unaware whenever
the default action is close enough to the first best effort level. They extend their analysis
to the case where agents differ in their level of awareness and derive the optimal menu of
contracts. Also Zhao (2008) considers a moral hazard problem with unawareness of actions
and default actions. In his setup both the principal and the agent can be unaware of their
action space.
Finally, this work is related to the literature on moral hazard and heterogeneous priors.
Santos-Pinto (2008) analyzes a principal-agent model with an agent that holds wrong beliefs
about the impact of his effort and calls such biased beliefs self-image. He shows that if
positive self-image and effort are complements, the impact of positive self-image is favorable
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to the principal.1 If unawareness in my model is interpreted as assigning probability zero
to certain outcomes, the resulting distribution does not satisfy the imposed restrictions in
Santos-Pinto (2008). Consequently his results do not apply in my framework.2 Also De la
Rosa (2011) analyzes a moral hazard problem with overconfidence.
2.3 The Model
There is a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. The agent receives utility from
monetary transfers C and disutility from effort e. I assume that the utility function is sepa-
rable in money and effort: U(C, e) = υ(C)− e, where υ satisfies the Inada conditions. Effort
can take two possible values e ∈ {eL, eH}, where eL < eH .
The uncertainty of the environment is captured by a finite set of elementary contingencies,
denoted by Θ. A contingency θ ∈ Θ is a random variable with realizations 0 and 1. It can
be thought of as an elementary proposition that can be either true or false. The probability
of θ = 1 depends on the effort of the agent. Throughout the main part of the analysis it
will be assumed that, given e, the contingencies in Θ are conditionally independent of each
other.
Assumption 1. The random variables θ and θ′ are conditionally independent given e, for
any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
The assumption of conditional independence may not always be satisfied in reality. For
example, the potential recall in the introductory example may very well be correlated with
the sales volume of other products of the firm. However, the tradeoff between participation
and incentive effect does not hinge on Assumption 1 and the analysis is made tractable. In
contrast, the result on justifiability of the optimal contract depends crucially on this assump-
tion. The implications of relaxing Assumption 1 on the optimal contract and its justifiability
1The agent is said to have a positive self-image, whenever there is first-order stochastic dominance of the
agent’s perceived distribution over the actual distribution for any action. Santos-Pinto (2008) defines effort
and self-image as complements if first-order stochastic dominance is stronger for high effort than for low
effort.
2In my set up the agent implicitly has a positive self-image if he is unaware of outcome decreasing
contingencies. If I assume that the true distribution conditional on high effort first-order stochastically
dominates the true distribution conditional on low effort and that the agent is unaware of negative outcome
shocks only, unawareness implies that effort and positive self-image are substitutes instead of complements.
This is because first-order stochastic dominance implies that the probability of low outcomes is more likely
under low than high effort. Unawareness implicitly implies that the agent assigns probability zero to some of
these outcomes given high and low effort. Thus, the agent’s beliefs deviate stronger for low than high effort.
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are discussed in Section 2.5.1 and Section 2.5.4 respectively.
Awareness Structure: Unlike in the standard moral hazard problem, the agent is unaware
of some contingencies. The subset the agent is aware of is denoted by ΘA ⊂ Θ. The princi-
pal is aware of the entire set Θ. Further, he knows that the agent is unaware and he knows
which contingencies the agent is unaware of. The agent is unaware of his unawareness and
is unaware of the principal’s superior awareness. When the principal writes the contract he
can enlarge the agent’s awareness by mentioning contingencies in the contract, denoted by
X ⊆ Θ\ΘA. The agent updates his awareness and considers henceforth all contingencies in
the set Θ̂ = ΘA ∪X.
State Spaces: A state of the world in this environment can be thought of as a sequence
of 0’s and 1’s of length |Θ| that specifies the realization of each θ ∈ Θ. Let S denote the
collection of these sequences. Since the agent is unaware of some contingencies, he does
not perceive the actual state space but a less expressive one. A state in the agent’s sub-
jective state space can be thought of as a sequence of 0’s and 1’s of length |Θ̂| < |Θ| that
specifies the realization of each θ ∈ Θ̂. Let Ŝ denote the collection of these sequences. For
example, let Θ = {θ1, θ2} and Θ̂ = {θ1}. Objectively there are four states of the world
S = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, but the agent only perceives two Ŝ = {(0), (1)}. In terms
of the introductory example, suppose there are two relevant contingencies: the marketing
strategy being a success and the product having adverse effects on consumers’ health. If
the manager is unaware of the latter, his subjective state space distinguishes between the
marketing strategy being a success or a failure but misses the dimension about the adverse
health effects. Thus, the set of contingencies the agent is aware of determines the dimension
of his subjective state space. Disclosing a contingency in the contract implies adding another
dimension to his subjective state space.
Outcomes: There is a project with stochastic outcome Y , which is observable and ver-
ifiable. Outcome is a function of the contingencies in Θ. Since state s ∈ S specifies the
realization of each contingency θ ∈ Θ, we can define outcome realization y directly as a
function of the state s ∈ S:
y = f(s), s ∈ S.
Let Y denote the range of function f . Since the agent does not know the objective state
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space S, he cannot know Y . Instead he perceives outcome as a function of the contingencies
he is aware of. I assume that the agent’s perceived outcome is equivalent to the objective
outcome when the contingencies the agent is unaware of are not realized, denoted by θ = 0,
implying that the agent considers a subset of possible worlds. Note that θ = 0 can refer to
an elementary proposition being true or false.3 A way to think about this assumption is that
there are events that the agent has never observed and that have never crossed his mind.
Instead, the agent has some implicit assumptions about the underlying state of the world,
but is unaware of these implicit assumptions (Li, 2008). Consequently, he cannot imagine
a world in which a proposition implicitly assumed to be true (false) turns out to be false
(true). This assumption is prevalent in the literature of unawareness.4
The agent’s outcome function is
y = f̂(s), s ∈ Ŝ.
where f̂(s) = f(s, 0, 0, 0, ...), s ∈ Ŝ.5 Let Ŷ denote the range of function f̂ .
Assumption 2. |Y| = 2|Θ|.
A2 imposes that outcome differs across every state of the world, which implies that the
agent knows a subset of possible outcomes whenever he is not fully aware, Ŷ ⊂ Y . This
implies that the agent is not only unaware of some contingencies but also of their conse-
quences. Coming back to the introductory example, the manager is not only unaware of
a possible recall but also of its effect on the firm’s performance. If the recall is realized,
the manager is surprised and receives the minimal payment. The moral hazard problem to
have in mind is one, where unforeseen contingencies lead to unforeseen consequences and the
agent may be surprised ex-post. The assumption that f is a one-to-one function is important
for tractability of the characterization of the tradeoff between participation and incentives.6
3For example, if a decision maker is unaware of the concept of gravity and θ is the elementary statement
that there is gravity, then θ = 0 means that the elementary statement is true. Similarly, if a decision maker
is unaware of global warming and θ is the elementary statement that there is global warming, then θ = 0
means that the elementary statement is false.
4See for example Modica et al. (1998) and Heifetz et al. (2013). Furthermore, the concept of a default
dimension is closely related to the assumption of a default action in the literature on unawareness of actions
(e.g. von Thadden and Zhao (2012a)).
5Assume that any sequence s ∈ S is ordered such that s = {s′, s′′}, with s′ ∈ Ŝ.
6A2 implies that disclosing contingencies allows the principal to use a more informative outcome distri-
bution, which implies that the effect of disclosure on incentives is always positive. If this assumption is given
up, the incentive effect is ambiguous.
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More general outcome functions are discussed in Section 2.7.1.
Probability Measures: Let pi(y|e) denote the probability of y ∈ Y given effort e and as-
sume pi(y|e) > 0, ∀y ∈ Y . The distribution over Y is known to the principal. The agent is
assumed to have correct beliefs over the distribution of contingencies within his awareness.
So whenever the principal expands the agent’s state space by making him aware of a new
contingency, the agent understands the conditional probability distribution of this contin-
gency. This belief updating rule implies that the likelihood ratios of events in the original
state space remain unchanged and that the relative probability mass assigned to the newly
revealed outcomes is correct.7
Under the assumption of independence the probability that θ = 0 for all θ 6∈ Θ̂ is constant
across all y ∈ Ŷ . Let Π(Θ̂|e) := ∏θ 6∈Θ̂ Pr[θ = 0|e] denote the probability that y ∈ Ŷ . Then
the agent assigns probability
pi(y|e) := pi(y|e)
Π(Θ̂|e) , y ∈ Ŷ ,
to outcome y ∈ Ŷ conditional on effort e, which is simply the conditional probability given
that none of the unforeseen contingencies are realized.
The Contract: As in the standard principal-agent problem, effort is assumed to be non-
observable; thus, the principal offers a contract based on the observable and verifiable out-
come Y . The distribution of Y depends on the effort of the agent. It is assumed that
E[Y |eH ] > E[Y |eL] and that E[Y |eH ]− E[Y |eL] is large enough such that it is always opti-
mal to induce high effort. This allows me to abstract the analysis from the choice of effort.
In Section 2.7.2 the optimal action choice will be discussed. The agent is assumed to have
limited liability; thus, the outcome contingent compensation C is non-negative for all y ∈ Y .
Due to the Inada conditions imposed on υ(·), the limited liability constraint will not be
7For a detailed study of belief updating under growing awareness see Karni and Vierø (2012). They
derive a belief updating rule that requires that the likelihood ratios of events in the original state space
remain unchanged, but their model stays silent about the absolute levels of these probabilities. The belief
updating rule in my framework is a special case of the belief updating rule derived by Karni and Vierø (2012).
The additional assumption that the relative probability mass assigned to newly revealed states is correct
facilitates the exposition of the tradeoff between participation and incentive effect. If this assumption is given
up, principal and agent may hold different beliefs about the likelihood of newly revealed contingencies, making
the principal want to bet with the agent on the realization of these contingencies. With the assumption that
the agent understands the likelihood of contingencies once aware, I abstract from such side bets.
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binding for outcomes within the agent’s awareness. Instead, it implements a lower bound on
payments for outcomes the agent is unaware of.
Definition 1. A contract is a pair (Θ̂, C) with ΘA ⊆ Θ̂ ⊆ Θ and C : Y −→ R+0 .
Let (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) denote the contract that maximizes the principal’s expected payoff. Follow-
ing Filiz-Ozbay (2012), Definition 2 introduces a notion of incompleteness.
Definition 2. A contract (Θ̂, C) is incomplete if Θ̂ 6= Θ. Otherwise it is complete.
Suppose the proposed contract is incomplete such that Y\Ŷ is non-empty. The principal
can construct the contract such that he pays zero to the agent when an unforeseen level
of outcome is realized, e.g. by finding a functional form of the compensation scheme on Y
satisfying zero payments for all y ∈ Y\Ŷ or by including a ”zero payment otherwise” clause
in the contract. I will abstract from the question of how the principal can implement zero
payments in the unforeseen states, but analyze a reduced form of this model. Zero pay-
ments at y ∈ Y\Ŷ are optimal because any positive payment in these states will leave the
agent’s expected utility unaffected, but make the principal strictly worse off. This implies
that whenever the contract is incomplete, the agent’s expected utility evaluated at objec-
tive beliefs is strictly lower than his reservation utility. It is important to note that zero
payments facilitate notation considerably, but that the results hold for any other minimal
payment as long as it is low enough.8 Thus, the optimal contract in this environment can
be interpreted as a contract that promises a fixed payment and that rewards the agent with
boni for certain outcomes. Whenever a contingency is realized that is not anticipated by the
agent, the bonus is not paid.
Expected Payoffs: The principal’s outside option in the case of rejection is assumed to
be zero. His expected payoff is given by
EUP =
{ ∑
y∈Y pi(y|e) [y − C(y)] if the agent accepts,
0 if the agent rejects.
The agent assesses his expected utility with respect to his restricted state space. The outside
option of rejecting the contract is U¯ :
EUA =
{ ∑
y∈Ŷ pi(y|e)υ(C(y))− e if the agent accepts,
U if the agent rejects.
8Low enough means that the minimal payment constraint is not binding for outcomes within the agent’s
awareness. Otherwise the tradeoff for the respective outcomes changes.
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2.4 The Optimal Contract with Observable Effort
In order to have a benchmark it is useful to first characterize the contract when effort is
observable. If effort is observable and verifiable the contract can be made directly contingent
on the action of the agent. The principal solves the problem:
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH) [y − C(y)]
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ (C(y))− eH ≥ U
C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y .
When the contract is complete, it is optimal to give the agent full insurance. This can be
seen from the first order conditions
1
υ′(C(y))
= λ, ∀y ∈ Y .
The agent receives CFB = υ−1
(
U¯ + eH
)
independent of the realization of Y . The first best
is achieved. Now suppose the principal leaves the agent unaware of some contingencies. The
first order conditions for C(y), y ∈ Ŷ are
1
υ′(C(y))
= λ
1
Π(Θ̂|eH) .
The first-order conditions imply that the transfer across y ∈ Ŷ is constant. The optimal
compensation scheme is simply Ĉ∗(y) = CFB,∀y ∈ Ŷ and Ĉ∗(y) = 0,∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ . The
expected payment to the agent is Π(Θ̂|eH)CFB. It is minimized when the probability of
paying, Π(Θ̂|eH), is minimized, which is achieved when the agent’s awareness level is lowest.
Consequently, if effort is observable, it is optimal to reveal nothing to the agent.
Proposition 2.4.1. Under A1, A2 and observable effort, Θ̂∗ = ΘA.
The reason for result 2.4.1 is that disclosing contingencies to the agent makes the par-
ticipation constraint more costly to satisfy. Since effort is observable there is no incentive
effect and only the participation effect matters.
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2.5 The Optimal Contract with Unobservable Effort
If effort is unobservable, the principal maximizes his expected profit subject to the partici-
pation constraint, the incentive constraint and the limited liability constraints. The partici-
pation constraint assures that the agent accepts the contract. The incentive constraint leads
the agent to exert high effort eH . The principal solves:
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH) [y − C(y)] , (2.1)
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ (C (y))− eH ≥ U, (2.2)
eH ∈ arg max
e
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e)υ (C (y))− e
 , (2.3)
C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y , (2.4)
where (2.2) is the participation constraint, (2.3) is the incentive constraint and (2.4) is the
limited liability constraint. Assume that a solution to the maximization problem exists.9
The analysis of the optimal contract can be divided into two steps. In step one the principal
chooses the optimal compensation scheme Ĉ given announcement Θ̂. In step two he chooses
the optimal level of awareness Θ̂.
2.5.1 Step 1: Optimal Compensation Scheme given Awareness Θ̂
The optimal compensation scheme given awareness Θ̂ is characterized by the necessary con-
dition
1
υ′(C(y))
=
1
Π(Θ̂|eH)
(
λ+ γ
[
1− pi
(
y|eL)
pi (y|eH)
])
, ∀y ∈ Ŷ , (2.5)
as well as C(y) = 0,∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ .10 Note that the optimal compensation scheme varies with
the likelihood ratio pi(y|e
L)
pi(y|eH) of the restricted information structure Θ̂ instead of Θ. Since the
agent is unaware of the contingencies in Θ\Θ̂, these signals cannot be used to induce eH . As
9For details see Grossman and Hart (1983).
10Inada conditions assure that (2.4) is not binding for C(y), y ∈ Ŷ.
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in the standard moral hazard problem both participation and incentive constraint hold with
equality. Let Ĉ denote the solution to this system of equations.
Lemma 2.5.1. Assume A1 and A2. Under Ĉ, both λ > 0 and γ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2.9.2.
Remark: If the assumption of conditional independence is relaxed, the optimal compensa-
tion scheme additionally varies with the ratio pi(y|e
H)
pi(y|eH) , y ∈ Ŷ.11 Under Assumption 1, pi(y|e
H)
pi(y|eH)
is constant across all y ∈ Ŷ, but if conditional dependence is not ruled out, this ratio gener-
ally varies across outcomes. In such a case, it is optimal to promise relative large payments
for outcomes that are positively correlated with contingencies the agent is left unaware of,
because these payments are less likely to be realized.
The optimal compensation scheme Ĉ(·) across y ∈ Ŷ coincides with the the optimal
compensation scheme of the standard principal-agent model with symmetric awareness and
restricted information structure Θ̂. To see this, suppose that Ŝ is the objective state space
and that both, the principal and the agent, are symmetrically aware of Ŝ. Then the principal
solves
min
C(·)
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)C(y) (2.6)
subject to (2.2) and (2.3). Let CC
Θ̂
denote the solution to this problem. CC
Θ̂
is the op-
timal complete contract under symmetric awareness and information structure Θ̂. Under
asymmetric awareness, the expected payment to the agent is∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH)C(y) = Π(Θ̂|eH)
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)C(y)− (1− Π(Θ̂)) · 0,
which is equivalent to (2.6) except for the scaling factor Π(Θ̂|eH). Since Π(Θ̂|eH) is nothing
but a constant for a given Θ̂, the two optimization problems are equivalent and Ĉ(y) = CC
Θ̂
(y)
for all y ∈ Ŷ . The expected profit of the optimal incomplete contract is simply the expected
11If Assumption 1 is relaxed, the first-order condition is
1
υ′(C(y))
=
pi(y|eH)
pi(y|eH)
{
λ+ γ
[
1− pi(y|e
L)
pi(y|eH)
]}
, ∀y ∈ Ŷ.
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payment of CC
Θ̂
weighted by the probability that none of the unforeseen contingencies are
realized:
E[Ĉ(Y )|eH ] = Π(Θ̂|eH)E[CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH ].
2.5.2 Step 2: Optimal Awareness Θ̂∗
The optimal level of disclosure is characterized by identifying the basic trade off between
participation and incentives of disclosing contingencies to the agent. To separate the effect
on incentives from the effect on participation, it is useful to compare the expected payment
of complete contracts under different information structures.
Lemma 2.5.2. Let Z be a non-empty subset of Θ\Θ̂. Then
∆CZ
Θ̂
:= E
[
CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH]− E [CC
Θ̂∪Z(Y )|eH
] ≥ 0,
with strict inequality if and only if ∃θ ∈ Z such that Pr[θ = 1|eH ] 6= Pr[θ = 1|eL].
Proof. See Appendix 2.9.3.
This result is in line with Holmstro¨m’s Sufficient Statistic Theorem (1979), which states
that a signal θ is valuable if and only if it is informative.12 Valuable means that both, prin-
cipal and agent, can be made better off by including θ because agency costs are reduced.
Under independence, θ is informative if and only if Pr[θ = 1|eH ] 6= Pr[θ = 1|eL].
2.5.3 The Basic Tradeoff
To understand the effect of disclosing a subset of Θ\ΘA on participation and incentives,
compare the expected payoff of the principal when revealing nothing (Θ̂ = ΘA) and revealing
set X (Θ̂ = ΘA ∪X):
Π(ΘA|eH)E
[
CCΘA(Y )|eH
]
≷ Π(ΘA ∪X|eH)E
[
CCΘA∪X(Y )|eH
]
, (2.7)
or simply ∏
θ∈X
Pr
[
θ = 0 | eH]E [CCΘA(Y )|eH] ≷ E [CCΘA∪X(Y )|eH] .
12Holmstro¨m (1979) shows this for continuous outcome and continuous effort.
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Using ∆CXΘA = E
[
CCΘA(Y )|eH
] − E [CCΘA∪X(Y )|eH] we can restate (2.7) in terms of gains
and losses of revealing set X:
∆CXΘA ≷
(
1−
∏
θ∈X
Pr
[
θ = 0|eH])E [CCΘA(Y )|eH] . (2.8)
∆CXΘA captures the incentive effect of disclosing set X. The announcement of a set of in-
formative contingencies allows the principal to use these contingencies as a signal about the
agent’s effort. This information gain is ∆CXΘA . (1 −
∏
θ∈X Pr[θ = 0|eH ])E[CCΘA(Y )|eH ] cap-
tures the participation effect of disclosing X. With probability 1−∏θ∈X Pr [θ = 0|eH] one
of the contingencies in X is realized. When announcing ΘA∪X, the principal has to pay the
agent a positive wage, while when announcing ΘA, he pays zero. Disclosing a contingency
to the agent consequently tightens the participation constraint.
When effort is observable, there is no incentive effect, which is why it is optimal to keep the
agent unaware. When effort is unobservable, the principal chooses Θ̂ such that the net gain
of revelation is maximized. Since Θ is finite, he compares a finite number of announcement
strategies and their respective expected payoffs. Whenever there exists a Θ̂ such that the in-
centive effect outweighs the participation effect, the principal enlarges the agent’s awareness.
Figure 2.1: Tradeoff
Pr@Θ = 1 eH D1ΠΘ Pr@Θ = 1 eLD
Participation Loss
Incentive Gain
2.5. THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT WITH UNOBSERVABLE EFFORT 53
To illustrate the basic tradeoff consider the announcement of a single contingency θ 6∈ ΘA:
∆CθΘA vs. Pr
[
θ = 1|eH]E [CCΘA(Y )|eH] .
Figure 1 shows the incentive gain and the participation loss as a function of Pr[θ = 1|eH ].13
Lemma 2.5.3. Assume A1 and A2. Let ∆θ :=
∣∣Pr[θ = 1|eH ]− Pr[θ = 1|eL]∣∣. ∆CθΘA is
monotonically increasing in ∆θ.
Proof. See Appendix 2.9.4
∆θ is a measure of informativeness of signal θ. Lemma 2.5.3 states that the incentive gain
∆CθΘA is increasing in the informativeness of θ. Consequently, the incentive gain is decreasing
on the interval [0,Pr[θ = 1|eL]) and increasing on the interval (Pr[θ = 1, eL], 1]. When
Pr[θ = 1|eL] = Pr[θ = 1|eH ], the signal is uninformative and the incentive gain is zero. The
participation loss Pr
[
θ = 1|eH]E [CCΘA(Y )|eH] is linearly increasing in Pr[θ = 1|eH ]. Figure
1 shows that it is optimal to reveal any informative contingency θ if the probability that
θ = 1 conditional on high effort is small enough. This result is summarized in Observation
2.5.4.
Observation 2.5.4. Assume A1 and A2. For every θ ∈ Θ\ΘA there exists a threshold
piθ ∈ (0,Pr[θ = 1|eL]) such that if Pr[θ = 1|eH ] < piθ, the incentive effect outweighs the
participation effect.
Example 5.1 The tradeoff associated to the announcement of a single contingency gen-
erally depends on the announcement of other contingencies. Going back to the introductory
example, suppose the manager is not only unaware of a possible lawsuit but also of a possible
merger. Whether it is profitable to reveal the merger not only depends on its likelihood con-
ditional on the manager’s effort, but also on whether the firm reveals the lawsuit or not. If the
lawsuit is revealed and its realization is highly informative about the manager’s effort, the in-
centive effect of revealing the possibility of a merger is negligible. Thus, the tradeoff between
incentives and participation associated to the announcement of a single contingency gener-
ally depends on the announcement of other contingencies. To see how the single contingency
tradeoff changes as the underlying awareness extends, consider the example of N symmetric
contingencies, Θ\ΘA = {θ1, ..., θN}, where symmetric means that every contingency has the
same distribution. Let α := Pr[θi = 0|eH ], i = 1, ...N and Θ̂n := ΘA ∪ θ1 ∪ ...∪ θn.14 The net
13This figure shows ∆CθΘA and Pr[θ = 1|eH ]E[CCΘA(Y )|eH ] for the following specification: υ(C) =
C1−σ
1−σ , σ = 0.5, e
H = 1, eL = 0, U¯ = 5. There are two contingencies. Contingency θ ∈ ΘA with
Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = 0.65 and Pr[θ = 1|eL] = 0.5 and contingency θ′ 6∈ ΘA with Pr[θ′ = 1|eL] = 0.5.
14For notational convenience let Θ̂0 = ΘA.
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gain of revealing the nth contingency is:
NG(θn) := α
N−n
(
∆Cθn
Θ̂n−1
− (1− α)E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]
)
.
The value of NG(θn) is determined by two factors. First, there is the difference between
incentive gain and participation loss as illustrated above. This difference is weighted by the
probability that the gains and losses are realized, αN−n. Generally, NG(θn) can decrease or
increase in n. A sufficient condition for NG(θn) to be decreasing in n is:
E[CC
Θ̂n
(Y )|eH ]2 < E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]E[CC
Θ̂n+1
(Y )|eH ], for all n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}. (2.9)
Condition (2.9) implies that the expected payment of the complete contract CC
Θ̂n
as a func-
tion of n is sufficiently convex, i.e. the inclusion of signal θn in the information structure
reduces agency costs strongly when n is small but only marginally when n is large.15 If this
condition holds, the net gain of revealing a contingency is decreasing in the number of other
contingencies that are revealed and the optimal level of disclosure is Θ̂∗ = {ΘA, θ1, ..., θn∗}
such that:
NG(θn∗) ≥ 0 and NG(θn∗+1) < 0.
2.5.4 Justifiability of the Contract
If the contract is incomplete, the agent’s perception of the world differs from the perception
of the principal. An important question is whether the proposed contract can elicit suspicion
on the side of the agent. Upon receiving contract (Θ̂, C) the agent may ask herself whether
announcement Θ̂ and compensation scheme C are optimal for the principal. Filiz-Ozbay
(2012) introduces an equilibrium refinement which requires that the equilibrium contract
maximizes the principal’s expected payoff from the viewpoint of the agent. The agent can
only contemplate contracts within his awareness. The set of contracts the agent is aware of
is given by the set of all contracts (Θ˜, C˜) such that ΘA ⊆ Θ˜ ⊆ Θ̂. Let EΘ˜ and Y˜ denote the
expectation operator and the set of outcomes associated to awareness Θ˜. A contract (Θ̂, C)
is called justifiable if is optimal for the principal from the viewpoint of the agent, both in
terms of compensation and in terms of the level of disclosure.
15Condition (2.9) is satisfied, for example when υ(C) = C
1−σ
1−σ , σ = 0.5, e
H = 1, eL = 0, U¯ = 9, N = 5,
α = 0.6 and Pr[θ = 0|eL] = Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = 0.5.
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Definition 3. For any Θ˜ such that ΘA ⊆ Θ˜ ⊆ Θ̂, let CΘ˜ : Y → R+0 denote the solution to
max
C
EΘ˜[Y − C(Y )|e],
s.t. EΘ˜[υ(C(Y ))|e]− e ≥ U,
e ∈ arg max
e˜
{EΘ˜[υ(C(Y ))|e˜]− e˜} ,
and C(y) = 0,∀y ∈ Y\Y˜. A contract (Θ̂, C) is called justifiable if
Θ̂ ∈ arg max
Θ˜
EΘ̂[Y − CΘ˜(Y )|e] and C(y) = CΘ̂(y),∀y ∈ Ŷ .
{CΘ˜}ΘA⊆Θ˜⊆Θ̂ is the set of justifiable compensation schemes for each level of disclosure the
agent can contemplate. A contract (Θ̂, C) is called justifiable if it satisfies two requirements.
First, compensation scheme C has to be justifiable for awareness Θ̂ and second, form the
viewpoint of the agent, compensation scheme C is the best of all justifiable compensation
schemes in the set {CΘ˜}ΘA⊆Θ˜⊆Θ̂. Note that a justifiable contract generally exists, because
if none of the incomplete contracts is justifiable, the principal can always resort to the full
awareness contract (Θ, CCΘ ). Since full disclosure implies that the principal and the agent
share the same beliefs, (Θ, CCΘ ) is necessarily justifiable. Thus, provided that there is a
solution to the principal’s optimization problem under symmetric awareness Θ, a justifiable
contract exists. Since the optimal contract (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) is not necessarily complete, the question
arises under which conditions the optimal contract is justifiable for the agent.
Proposition 2.5.5. Assume A1 and A2. (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) is justifiable according to Definition 3
if and only if EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ 0 and EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ EΘ̂∗ [Y |eL] − C¯, where
C¯ = υ−1(U + eL).
Proof. See Appendix 2.9.5
A necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal contract to be justifiable is that the
principal’s expected utility is non-negative and that eH is the optimal action choice from
the viewpoint of the agent. Note that in the characterization of the optimal contract, actual
outcome levels in Y play no role because only the likelihood ratio associated with each out-
come level is relevant for providing of incentives. If we require the contract to be justifiable,
this is no longer necessarily the case. Whenever the optimal contract is incomplete, the
agent perceives only a subset of possible outcomes. It is possible that the optimal contract
leaves the agent unaware of high outcomes such that EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] < 0 whereas
E[Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ 0. Similarly, it is possible that the optimal contract leaves the agent
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unaware of outcomes that are strongly correlated with effort such that EΘ̂∗ [Y −CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] <
EΘ̂∗ [Y |eL]− C¯ whereas E[Y −CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ E[Y |eL]− C¯.16 If any of the two conditions in
Proposition 2.5.5 is violated, the refinement introduces another dimension in the tradeoff.
The principal is no longer only concerned with the distributional properties of the contin-
gencies in Θ\ΘA, but also with the outcomes an announcement reveals.
Given that the expected profit evaluated at the agent’s beliefs is non-negative and higher
at eH than at eL, the optimal contract (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) is justifiable. Justifiability of Ĉ∗ is straight
forward. If the optimal contract is complete, principal and agent share the same beliefs.
Hence, Ĉ∗ maximizes the principal’s expected payoff from the agent’s perspective. If the op-
timal contract is incomplete, we know that the transfer rule for outcomes within the agent’s
awareness coincides with the optimal compensation scheme of the complete contract given
information structure Θ̂. Since the agent thinks that the contract is complete, Ĉ∗ solves the
principal’s optimization problem given the agent’s beliefs.
To see justifiability of Θ̂∗, remember that the agent can only consider the announcement
of contingencies within his awareness. Suppose ΘA ⊂ Θ̂∗. The agent evaluates the principal’s
expected payoff for every announcement Θ̂∗\Z, where Z ∈ Θ̂∗\ΘA. The agent knows that
given announcement Θ̂∗\Z the optimal compensation scheme is C(y) = CC
Θ̂∗\Z(y) for all y
within the agent’s hypothetical awareness Θ̂∗\Z and zero otherwise. Thus, after reading the
contract, the agent understands the principal’s optimal contract for any level of awareness
lower or equal than his actual awareness, but he does not understand that there may remain
contingencies that he is unaware of. For Θ̂∗ to be justifiable, the following condition has to
be satisfied
EΘ̂
[
CC
Θ̂∗(Y )|eH
] ≤ ∏
θ∈Θ̂∗\Z
Pr[θ = 0|eH ]EΘ̂
[
CC
Θ̂∗\Z(Y )|eH
]
, (2.10)
for any Z ⊆ Θ̂∗\ΘA. This coincides with the optimality condition of the principal. Conse-
quently, (2.10) is fulfilled and Θ̂∗ can be rationalized by the agent.
16An example for the first violation is a potential innovation that the manager is unaware of without
which the firm is not profitable. It seems more realistic that firms stay silent about bad news rather than
good news, which may have reasons not captured in this model (e.g. restriction to monotone compensation
schemes). The second violation requires that the agent is unaware of an event that is sufficiently correlated
with his effort and that is sufficiently likely, e.g. the success of an advertisement campaign. It seems more
realistic that decision makers are unaware of low probability events rather than events that occur frequently,
so the economic relevance of both violations may be restricted.
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Note that the assumption of conditional independence is crucial for justifiability of the
optimal contract. If this assumption is not satisfied the optimal compensation scheme varies
with the ratio pi(y)
pi(y)
, y ∈ Ŷ , which cannot be rationalized by the agent. If we assume that
the agent rejects any non-justifiable contract, this implies that the principal proposes the
contract that is optimal under conditional independence, {Ĉ∗, Θ̂∗}, in order to ensure accep-
tance by the agent.
Chen and Zhao (2009) propose two additional equilibrium concepts: the trap-filtered
equilibrium and the trap-filtered equilibrium with cognition. In the trap-filtered equilibrium
the agent assigns some probability ρ to the event that a non-justifiable contract is a trap and
probability 1− ρ to the event that the contract is a consequence of the principal’s mistake.
If the contract is a trap the agent is better of rejecting it, if the contract is proposed by
mistake, the agent prefers to accept it. Applying this equilibrium concept to my framework
implies that, given EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] < 0 or EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] < EΘ̂∗ [Y |eL] − C¯, the
principal finds it optimal to propose a non-justifiable contract if and only if the agent’s belief
that the contract is a trap is sufficiently low. In the trap-filtered equilibrium with cognition
the agent can exert cognitive effort to learn about the probability that the contract is a trap.
Cognitive effort is costly, so the agent chooses a level such that the marginal cost of cognitive
effort equals its marginal information gain. When designing the contract the principal takes
the agent’s cognitive effort choice into account. Depending on the agent’s prior and the
cognitive cost function, the principal offers either a justifiable contract that is accepted with
probability one or he offers a non-justifiable contract that is only accepted when the agent
does not learn that the contract is a trap.
2.6 Competing Principals
In the basic setup I analyze the optimization problem of a monopolistic principal. This
section addresses the question of how these results change when principals compete against
each other. Suppose there are N principals that are aware of Θ. They make simultaneous
offers, denoted by (Θ̂i, Ci), i = 1, ..., N . The agent updates his awareness after hearing all the
offers and accepts at most one. He considers henceforth every contingency in Θ̂1 ∪ ... ∪ Θ̂N .
If the agent is indifferent between two or more contracts he accepts each contract with equal
probability. I focus on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, (Θ̂i, Ci) = (Θ̂, C), i = 1, ..., N .
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In the absence of asymmetric awareness, principals engage in a Bertrand competition over
transfer rule C. In equilibrium they make zero profits and the surplus goes to the agent.
Assume that under full awareness the agent’s expected payoff is maximized when high effort
is implemented and let C∗ denote the equilibrium compensation scheme.
Assumption 3. Let E[υ(C∗(y))]− eH ≥ U and E[υ(C∗(y))]− eH ≥ υ(E[Y |eL])− eL, where
C∗ maximizes the aware agent’s payoff subject to his incentive constraint and the zero profit
constraint.
Proposition 2.6.1. Assume A1, A2 and A3. There is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
which the agent is fully aware and each principal offers the complete zero profit contract
(Θ, C∗).
Proof. See Appendix 2.9.6.
Proposition 2.6.1 states that the full awareness equilibrium exists.17 To see this, note
that whenever the announcements of the other principals promote full awareness the own an-
nouncement is not payoff relevant. Further, any change in the compensation scheme yields
either negative or zero expected profits for the standard Bertrand competition argument.
Thus, the full awareness equilibrium exists. In general there can be other equilibria in which
the agent is not fully aware. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 6.1 Suppose there are two contingencies, Θ = {θ1, θ2}, of which the agent is
aware of one, ΘA = {θ1}. Assume that θ1 is not informative about the agent’s action, i.e.
Pr[θ1 = 0|eL] = Pr[θ1 = 0|eH ]. There are two possible equilibria, one in which all principals
reveal θ2 and one in which the principals leave the agent unaware. In the latter there is no
incentive compatible compensation scheme, so the equilibrium action is eL. The principals
propose a fixed payment C¯ for all outcomes within the agent’s awareness and pay zero oth-
erwise, Whether the unawareness equilibrium exists or not depends on the distribution of
θ2.
If Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ] ≤ Pr[θ2 = 0|eL], θ2 is always revealed and the full awareness equilibrium
is unique. To see this, suppose (θ1, C¯) is the equilibrium contract and consider a deviation by
principal i, making the agent aware of contingency θ2 and splitting the second-best surplus
between them. The agent updates his awareness and chooses between the equilibrium con-
tract and the deviating contract. If he chooses the equilibrium contract, the agent exerts low
17Filiz-Ozbay (2012) derives a similar result in her framework.
2.6. COMPETING PRINCIPALS 59
effort and obtains payoff Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]υ(C¯)− eL. Since C¯ is feasible but not optimal under
symmetric awareness, the deviating principal can find a compensation scheme that is strictly
preferred by the agent and yields a positive profit. Thus, the full awareness equilibrium is
unique.
On the other hand, if Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ] > Pr[θ2 = 0|eL], the equilibrium in which all
principals offer (θ1, C¯) and the agent stays unaware may exist. C¯ is determined by the zero
profit condition of the principals:
E[Y |eL]− Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]C¯ = 0.
Note that the zero profit condition implies that C¯ is large if the probability that the principals
have to pay, Pr[θ2 = 0|eL], is small. Now suppose principal i deviates by offering a complete
contract (Θ, C˜). The agent chooses between the deviating contract and the equilibrium
contract. In contrast to the previous case the agent may find it optimal to adjust his
action choice when accepting the incomplete equilibrium contract, because the probability
of receiving C¯ is increasing in effort. If the agent accepts the equilibrium contract (θ1, C¯)
and exerts high effort, principals offering the equilibrium contract make a loss and the agent
obtains payoff
Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ]υ(C¯)− eH .
If Pr[θ2 = 0|eL] is sufficiently small such that C¯ is sufficiently large, this payoff exceeds the
surplus of the incentive compatible complete contract (Θ, C∗).18 In this case there is no
contract that attracts the agent and yields a positive expected payoff, making the deviation
unprofitable. Thus, the unawareness equilibrium exist.19
The intuition why competition may not necessarily lead to full revelation is that if the
18This is the case if
Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ]υ
(
E[Y |eL]
Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]
)
≥ E[υ(C∗)|eH ].
19Going back to the introductory example, suppose there is more than one firm and suppose all firms
are aware of their product’s effect on consumer health. In the unawareness equilibrium, firms do not reveal
possible adverse health effects to the manager. The manager, not taking this possibility into account, exerts
too little effort and may be surprised ex-post.
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agent’s perception of the world is sufficiently distorted, principals can make ”generous” offers
for outcomes the agent is aware of. Making the agent aware allows the agent to adjust his
action choice, exploiting the equilibrium offer in his favor at the cost of the principals. Since
this argument does not depend on the numbers of principals, even under intense competition
there may exist equilibria in which the agent is unaware and the constrained-efficient action
is not implemented.20
The possibility of unawareness despite competition in this setting is closely related to the
markets with shrouded attributes as described in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). The authors
analyze a competitive market setting in which firms offer a product that has hidden add-on
prices of which some consumers are unaware.21 Consumers can avoid paying for the add-on
by exerting substitution effort before purchasing the basic good, assumed to be inefficient.
Firms choose a price for the basic good and a price for the add-on. There exists an efficient
equilibrium in which firms set the price for the add-on low enough such that all consumers,
aware or unaware, find it optimal to purchase the add-on instead of exerting substitution
effort. However, if the share of unaware types is large enough, there exists another inefficient
equilibrium in which the add-on is shrouded and unaware consumers are exploited by the
firms. In this equilibrium firms offer a low price for the basic good and charge a high
price for the add-on. A consumer that is aware of the add-on optimally exerts substitution
effort prior to purchasing the good while an unaware consumer is forced to pay the high
price for the add-on. If the unaware consumer is made aware, he can profit from the low
price for the basic good and if this price is low enough, the efficient contract cannot attract
any consumer. Just as in the competition environment in my setting, there may exist an
inefficient equilibrium with unawareness in which the competitive effect is overturned by a
”curse of debiasing” (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006): disclosing the features of the inefficient
equilibrium contract makes this contract more attractive. Such a curse arises when the
contract that takes advantage of the unaware type may be taken advantage of by the aware
type.
20Note that there may also be equilibria in which the agent is unaware and exerts high effort. In such
an equilibrium, upon becoming aware, the agent exploits the principals’ equilibrium offer in his favor by
exerting low effort.
21Gabaix and Laibson (2006) call their consumers myopic and non-myopic instead of aware and unaware,
but the spirit is the same.
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2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 The Output Function
In the basic model, output is discrete and differs across every state of the world. If y is
not one-to-one and contingencies are not observable, both participation loss and incentive
gain of revelation are affected. The participation loss is generally diminished, because the
revelation of an unforeseen contingency does not necessarily imply the revelation of an unfore-
seen outcome. The incentive gain is no longer unambiguous, because the agent’s perceived
distribution of outcome can be more informative about the agent’s effort than the actual
distribution of outcome.
To see this, suppose there are only two possible realizations of outcome. The project can
be either a success or a failure, Y = {s, f} with s > f . Whether the project is a success or
a failure depends on the realization of Θ. If Θ̂ ⊂ Θ the agent is aware of outcomes {s, f}
but believes probability distribution pi(.|e). Now consider the tradeoff the principal faces
when disclosing θ 6∈ ΘA. Since the revelation of θ does not reveal any new outcomes, the
participation loss of the announcement is zero. The effect on incentives depends on how the
revealed contingency affects the perceived distribution of the agent. To see that the incentive
effect can be negative, suppose Θ = {θ1, θ2}, ΘA = {θ1} and assume θ2 is not informative,
i.e. Pr[θ2 = 1|eH ] = Pr[θ2 = 1|eL]. In the basic model Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = Pr[θ = 1|eL]
implies ∆CθΘA = 0, because the principal has the choice to ignore the realization of θ2.
Under Y = {s, f} this is no longer the case. Suppose that y = s whenever θ1 = θ2 = 0 and
y = f otherwise. Solving for the optimal compensation scheme, the expected payment under
Θ̂∗ = ΘA is smaller than the expected payment under Θ̂∗ = Θ.22 There is an incentive loss
22If the principal leaves the agent unaware, the optimal compensation scheme is
Cu(s) = υ−1
(
U¯ +
Pr[θ1 = 1|eL]eH − Pr[θ1 = 1|eH ]eL
Pr[θ1 = 1|eL]− Pr[θ1 = 1|eH ]
)
, Cu(f) = υ−1
(
U¯ − Pr[θ1 = 0|e
L]eH − Pr[θ1 = 0|eH ]eL
Pr[θ1 = 1|eL]− Pr[θ1 = 1|eH ]
)
.
If the principal reveals contingency θ2, the optimal compensation scheme is
Ca(s) = υ−1
(
U¯ +
(
1− Pr[θ1 = 0|eL] Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]
)
eH − (1− Pr[θ1 = 0|eH ] Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ]) eL
Pr[θ1 = 0|eH ] Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ]− Pr[θ1 = 0|eL] Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]
)
Ca(f) = υ−1
(
U¯ − Pr[θ1 = 0|e
L]eH − Pr[θ1 = 0|eH ]eL
Pr[θ1 = 1|eL]− Pr[θ1 = 1|eH ]
)
.
So Cu(f) = Ca(f) and υ(Cu(s)) − υ(Ca(s)) = −Pr[θ2=1|eH ]
Pr[θ2=0|eH ]
eH−eL
Pr[θ1=0|eH ]−Pr[θ1=0|eL] < 0, which implies that
E[Cu(Y )|eH ] < E[Ca(Y )|eH ].
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of revealing θ2 because the perceived distribution of the unaware agent is more informative
about the action choice than the true distribution.23
2.7.2 Optimal Action Choice
Throughout the analysis I assumed that E[Y |eH ] − E[Y |eL] is large enough such that the
principal always finds it optimal to induce eH . Unawareness makes incentives more costly,
hence it is generally possible that for different levels of awareness different levels of effort are
optimal. Since effort can only be high or low, the analysis of the optimal contract under low
effort is straightforward.
Proposition 2.7.1. Assume A1 and A2. If eL is the action choice, the optimal contract is
(ΘA, C
L) with CL(y) = υ−1(U¯ − eL), ∀y ∈ Ŷ and CL(y) = 0,∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ.
Proof. See Appendix 2.9.7.
The optimal contract inducing low effort leaves the agent unaware because there is no
incentive effect. The principal induces low effort in equilibrium if
E[Y |eL]−
∏
θ∈Θ\ΘA
Pr[θ = 0|eL]υ−1(U¯ − eL) > E[Y |eH ]−
∏
θ∈Θ\Θ̂∗
Pr[θ = 0|eL]E[CC
Θ̂∗(Y )|eH ].
Whether this is the case or not depends on the distributional properties of the random
variable Y , but it is easy to find examples where eH is the optimal action choice under full
awareness and eL is the optimal action choice under asymmetric awareness.
2.7.3 Heterogeneous Agents
In the basic model it is assumed that the principal knows the agent’s awareness ΘA. Sup-
pose now that awareness is private information and let β denote the principal’s prior on the
event that the agent is fully aware. Consider first the case of a monopolistic principal. To
make things interesting assume that the optimal contract for the unaware type is incom-
plete. The principal cannot screen the agent’s type, because this would require specifying
non-zero payments for outcomes the unaware type is unaware of, which consequently makes
23When the agent is aware of all outcomes as in the example, the problem is closely related to a framework
without unawareness but with heterogeneous priors. A further discussion on heterogeneous priors and moral
hazard can be found in Santos-Pinto (2008) and De la Rosa (2011).
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him aware.24 Hence, the principal either offers the optimal incomplete contract, which is
rejected by the aware type, or the optimal complete contract, which is accepted by all types.
The first option is optimal if the probability that the agent is unaware is large enough. This
is in line with von Thadden and Zhao (2012a), who show that in populations with a large
extent of unawareness, contracts are incomplete.25
Next, suppose that there are N principals competing with each other. The results derived
in Section 2.6 extend to this environment. There exists a full awareness equilibrium in which
principals reveal all contingencies and make zero profits in expectation. Furthermore, there
may exist equilibria in which the unaware type stays unaware, even under intense competi-
tion. In such equilibria the aware type is cross-subsidized by the unaware type. To see this
consider Example 6.1 but assume that the agent is aware of contingency θ2 with probability
β. Consider an equilibrium in which principals offer an incomplete contract which promises
a fixed transfer C¯ for all outcomes the unaware type is aware of and zero otherwise. Suppose
that C¯ is large enough such that the contract is accepted by both types and such that the
aware type finds it optimal to exert high effort. The unaware type does not take the zero
payments into account and exerts low effort.
Principals do not know whether the agent is aware or unaware and their payoff depends
the agent’s action choice. Ex-ante, the equilibrium contract yields payoff:
β
(
E[Y |eH ]− Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ]C¯
)
+ (1− β) (E[Y |eL]− Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]C¯) .
The zero-profit condition implies
C¯ =
βE[Y |eH ] + (1− β)E[Y |eL]
β Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ] + (1− β) Pr[θ2 = 0|eL] .
If the share of unaware types is large enough and Pr[θ2 = 0|eL] is small enough such that
C¯ is large enough, there is no complete contract that makes the aware type better of and
24This assumes that the principal wants to induce high effort for both types. However, it is possible that
the principal offers a (menu of) incomplete contract(s) and the two types choose different actions. This can
only be optimal if β is small enough.
25In von Thadden and Zhao (2012a) the principal can screen the types, which comes at a cost of not
incentivizing the aware type optimally, because otherwise he pretends to be unaware. If the share of aware
types is small, this cost is small and it is optimal to offer the screening menu that leaves the unaware agent
unaware.
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yields a non-negative expected payoff.26 Thus, no principal has incentives to deviate and
the unawareness equilibrium exists. Note that condition (2.11) implies that principals make
losses on the aware type while they make positive profits on the unaware type. In a market
with a population of agents this implies that aware types are cross-subsidized by unaware
types, just as in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). Such cross-subsidization between types can
occur in equilibrium only if there are sufficiently many unaware agents. Thus, the inefficient
equilibrium exists only if the extent of unawareness in the population is large enough.
2.7.4 The Agent as the Residual Claimant
The basic model assumes that the principal is the residual claimant. In the presence of
asymmetric awareness, ownership of the project matters, because the agent’s valuation of the
project depends on his level of awareness. If the agent is the residual claimant, unawareness
generally affects his perceived outside option
∑
y∈Ŷ pi(y|eH)υ(y). The principal solves:
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH)[P − C(y)]
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ (y + C(y)− P ) ≥
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ(y)
eH ∈ arg max
e
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e)υ(y + C(y)− P )− e

C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y ,
where P is the premium paid by the agent and C(y) is the outcome contingent transfer.27
As in in the basic model, revealing a contingency θ 6∈ ΘA involves a tradeoff between par-
ticipation and incentives. In addition, enlarging the agent’s awareness affects his perceived
26This is the case if
Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ]υ
(
βE[Y |eH ] + (1− β)E[Y |eL]
β Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ] + (1− β) Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]
)
≥ E[υ(C∗)|eH ]. (2.11)
27Due to the limited liability constraint the principal would like to scale up both P and C. In order to
have a solution, one has to assume that such a contract elicits suspicion on the side of the agent.
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outside option. This effect is favorable to the principal if∑
y∈Y˜
p˜i(y|eH)υ(y) <
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ(y),
where Θ˜ = Θ̂ ∪ θ, θ ∈ Θ\Θ̂. This is the case if E[Y |θ = 1] < E[Y |θ = 0], i.e. if θ = 1
is a negative outcome shock. Consequently, if the agent is the residual claimant, not only
do the distributional properties of θ 6∈ ΘA matter but also the outcome its announcement
reveals. Roughly speaking, when the agent is the residual claimant the principal includes
contingencies in the contract that are very unlikely, highly informative and that reveal ”bad”
outcomes. We can think of this setting as a contract between an insurer and an insuree,
where the insuree is partly unaware and effort affects the probability of incurring a loss. The
additional participation effect gives the insurer incentives to reveal severe calamities to the
insuree, such that the insuree is willing to buy insurance at a higher price.
2.7.5 Unawareness and Zero Probability Beliefs
A frequently raised concern is whether unawareness is observationally equivalent to full
awareness with zero probability beliefs (Li, 2008). Epistemically, unawareness has very dif-
ferent properties from zero probability beliefs. An agent is unaware if and only if he assigns
probability zero to an event and to its negation (Heifetz et al., 2013). Schipper (2013) shows
how this feature also implies behavioral differences between unawareness and zero probabil-
ity beliefs. However, the results derived in my model can be generated in a framework with
full awareness and zero probability beliefs. Under the interpretation of heterogeneous priors,
there are some caveats to be taken into account.
In order to derive my results in a framework with full awareness and zero probability
beliefs, the agent needs to update a zero probability prior to a non-zero posterior. Note
that such updating cannot be interpreted as a consequence of the arrival of new information,
since information in the standard state space model expands the set of null states instead of
narrowing it. Generating my results in the standard state space framework requires a model
that allows for manipulation of beliefs rather than revelation of information. Allowing the
principal to manipulate the agent’s beliefs without the presence of hard information is rather
difficult to motivate. Further, it is important to note that reporting the true distribution is
not incentive compatible for the principal if lying is possible. Consequently, there are strong
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assumptions on the message set available to the principal necessary.28 Given these caveats,
asymmetric awareness seems to be a more natural way to think about this environment and
the arising tradeoff.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper incorporates asymmetric awareness in the classical principal-agent model. It
shows that the principal makes the agent strategically aware and that the optimal contract
can be incomplete. Enlarging the agent’s awareness involves a tradeoff between participation
and incentives. The cost of disclosing contingencies to the agent is the payment in the states
that the agent is initially unaware of. The gain of disclosing contingencies to the agent is
the richer information structure that is used to induce incentives. Hence, it is profitable to
announce contingencies that have a low probability but are highly correlated with the effort
of the agent. If we allow for competition among principals, there exists a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in which the agent is fully aware and principals make zero profits. Remarkably,
there may exist other equilibria in which the agent stays unaware, even when competition
is tight. The existence of incomplete contracts in equilibrium may have important implica-
tions for welfare because whenever the agent is left unaware, the principal uses an inefficient
information structure to induce incentives.
In the proposed model, the principal is able to implement zero payments whenever there
is an event the agent is initially unaware of. This may not be feasible in real-life contract-
ing situations. If, for example, the compensation scheme is restricted to be monotone in
outcome, it is most costly to disclose low outcomes to the contracting partner. Hence, the
magnitude of the participation effect depends on the revealed outcome. Restricting the
set of feasible contracts adds interesting features to the optimal compensation scheme and
revelation strategy, but as long as the contracting partner with superior awareness is able
to profit from the other’s limited understanding of the underlying uncertainties the basic
tradeoff prevails.
An open question is how the results of the basic model change in a repeated game set-
ting. Whenever a contingency outside the agent’s awareness is realized, the agent observes an
28One may argue that also in the framework with unawareness an implicit assumption is that the principal
can only reveal ”true” contingencies. One could imagine a case, where the principal can include virtual events,
but since I assume that the agent, once aware, completely understands all consequences and the probability
distribution of a contingency, the restriction to ”true” contingencies seems to be natural.
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outcome considered impossible and consequently becomes aware of his initial unawareness.
This raises the question on how such a discovery affects the agent’s updated understanding
of the world, i.e whether the agent passively updates his state space or whether he under-
stands that there may be other events he is unaware of. To answer these questions, it is
necessary to enter the debate on decision making under awareness of unawareness, a largely
unexplored field in the literature. It seems plausible that also in repeated games asymmetric
awareness has interesting implications, for example on turnover rates and its indirect effects
on incentives, and thus poses interesting challenges for future research.
2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Suppose ΘA ⊂ Θ̂∗. The optimal compensation scheme is Ĉ∗(y) = υ−1(U¯ + eH) for all y ∈ Ŷ
and Ĉ∗(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y\Ŷ . Then the expected payment is∏
θ∈Θ\Θ̂∗
Pr[θ = 0|eH ]υ−1(U¯ + eH),
which is clearly greater than
∏
θ∈Θ\ΘA Pr[θ = 0|eH ]υ−1(U¯+eH), the expected payment under
Θ̂∗ = ΘA, due to the assumption pi(y|e) > 0, ∀y ∈ Y . Hence Θ̂∗ cannot be optimal.
2.9.2 Proof of Lemma 2.5.1
Suppose λ = 0. Since
∑
y∈Ŷ pi(y|eH) =
∑
y∈Ŷ pi(y|eL) = 1 and pi(.|eH) 6= pi(.|eL) there
must exist some y ∈ Ŷ such that pi(y|eH) − pi(y|eL) < 0. But since γ ≥ 0, λ = 0 would
imply that 1
υ′(C(y)) ≤ 0 for some y ∈ Ŷ , which violates the assumption υ′(·) > 0. Hence λ > 0.
Now suppose γ = 0. Then, the first-order conditions of the optimization problem imply
that compensation is fixed across outcomes within the agent’s awareness. But this implies
that the incentive constraint is no longer satisfied. Hence, γ > 0.
2.9.3 Proof of Lemma 2.5.2
Let S˜ denote the state space, let y˜ denote the output function with range Y˜ and let p˜i(.|e)
denote the probability belief given awareness Θ̂∪Z. Further, let ρ : Y˜ −→ Ŷ be the mapping
from set Y˜ to set Ŷ , where ρ(y˜(s˜)) = ŷ(ŝ) and ŝ ∈ Ŝ is a subsequence of s˜ ∈ S˜. Now consider
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the compensation scheme C˜ with C˜(y) = CC
Θ̂
(ρ(y)) for all y ∈ Y˜ . Note that C˜ satisfies both
participation and incentive constraint with equality.
Suppose Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = Pr[θ = 1|eL],∀θ ∈ Z. Then, for any y ∈ Y˜ we have
p˜i(y|eL)
p˜i(y|eH) =
pi(y|eL)
pi(y|eH) .
Hence, CC
Θ̂
satisfies the first order conditions and consequently solves the optimization prob-
lem. ∆CZ
Θ̂
= 0.
Now, suppose Pr[θ = 1|eH ] 6= Pr[θ = 1|eL] for some θ ∈ Z. Then, there must exist some
y, y′ ∈ ρ−1(y), y ∈ Ŷ such that
p˜i(y|eL)
p˜i(y|eH) 6=
p˜i(y′|eL)
p˜i(y′|eH) .
Consequently, CC
Θ̂
does not satisfy the first-order conditions. Hence, CC
Θ̂
is feasible but not
optimal, which implies that E[CC
Θ̂∪Z(Y |eH)] < E[CCΘ̂ (Y |eH)] and ∆CZΘ̂ > 0.
2.9.4 Proof of Lemma 2.5.3
To show that ∆CθΘA = E
[
CCΘA(Y )|eH
]−E [CCΘA∪θ(Y )|eH] is monotonically increasing in ∆θ
it is sufficient to show that E
[
CCΘA∪θ(Y )|eH
]
is monotonically decreasing in ∆θ. W.l.o.g. we
can assume Pr[θ = 1|eH ] > Pr[θ = 1|eL]. Let EΘA∪θ denote the expectation operator with
respect to awareness ΘA ∪ θ. Then we have:
EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|e, θ = 1
]
> EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|e, θ = 0
]
, e = eL, eH ,
which follows directly from the first-order conditions. The incentive constraint can be rewrit-
ten as
Pr[θ = 1|eH ]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eH , θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eH ]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eH , θ = 0
]− eH
= Pr[θ = 1|eL]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eL, θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eL]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eL, θ = 0
]− eL.
Now, consider probability Pr[θ = 1|eL]−ε with ε > 0. Under CCΘA∪θ and Pr[θ = 1|eL]−ε the
participation constraint is clearly satisfied with equality. Looking at the incentive constraint
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it is easy to see that
Pr[θ = 1|eH ]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eH , θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eH ]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eH , θ = 0
]− eH
> Pr[θ = 1|eL]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eL, θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eL]EΘA∪θ
[
υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eL, θ = 0
]− eL
−ε (EΘA∪θ [υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eL, θ = 1]− EΘA∪θ [υ(CCΘA∪θ(Y ))|eL, θ = 0]) .
We know that under the optimal transfer rule both constraints are satisfied with equality.
Consequently, given Pr[θ = 1|eL] − ε, CCΘA∪θ is feasible but not optimal. The same line
of reasoning applies to Pr[θ = 1|eH ], in which case both constraints are slack. Thus, the
expected payment given information structure ΘA ∪ θ is decreasing in ∆θ.
2.9.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5.5
It is clear that whenever EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] < 0, the agent thinks that the principal
would be strictly better off by not offering the contract. Similarly if EΘ̂∗ [Y −CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] <
EΘ̂∗ [Y |eL]− C¯ the agent cannot rationalize why the principal proposes an incentive compat-
ible contract. Hence, (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) cannot be justifiable.
Now suppose EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ 0 and EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ EΘ̂∗ [Y |eL]− C¯.
Justifiability of Ĉ∗: If Θ̂∗ = Θ, principal and agent share the same beliefs. Hence,
Ĉ∗ maximizes the principal’s expected payoff from the agent’s perspective. If Θ̂∗ 6= Θ,
Ĉ∗(y) = CC
Θ̂∗
(y) for all y ∈ Ŷ . Since the agent thinks that the contract is complete, Ĉ∗
maximizes the principal’s payoff according to the beliefs of the agent.
Justifiability of Θ̂∗: Θ̂∗ is optimal for the principal given the agent’s beliefs if
E
[
CC
Θ̂∗(Y |eH)
] ≤ ∏
θ∈Θ̂∗\Z
Pr[θ = 0|eH ]E
[
CC
Θ̂∗\Z(Y )|eH
]
,
for any Z ⊆ Θ̂∗\ΘA. This coincides with the optimality condition of the principal. Hence,
whenever EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ 0 and EΘ̂∗ [Y − CΘ̂∗(Y )|eH ] ≥ EΘ̂∗ [Y |eL] − C¯, (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) is
justifiable.
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2.9.6 Proof of Proposition 2.6.1
In the proposed equilibrium principals make zero profits and the agent obtains the positive
second-best surplus. Consider a deviation of principal i. The strategies are Θ̂j = Θ and
Cj = C
∗ for all j = 1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., N . A deviation in Θ̂i leaves the expected payoff
unaffected because the agent is aware of Θ̂1 ∪ ...∪ Θ̂N = Θ for all Θ̂i ⊆ Θ. A deviation in Ci
is not profitable for the standard Bertrand argument. C∗ maximizes the agent’s expected
utility subject to the zero profit constraint and the incentive constraint. A deviation Ci 6= C∗
such that the incentive constraint is satisfied must make either the agent or the principal
worse off. If the agent is worse off, he rejects the contract and the expected payoff is zero.
If the principal is worse off, he has a negative expected payoff. A deviation in Ci 6= C∗ such
that the incentive constraint is not satisfied makes either the agent worse off or the principal
worse off or both by Assumption 3. Hence, there is no profitable deviation and (Θ, C∗) is an
equilibrium.
2.9.7 Proof of Proposition 2.7.1
When eL is optimal, the principal solves
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eL) [y − C(y)]
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eL)υ (C (y))− eL ≥ U
C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y .
The optimal compensation scheme for a given Θ̂ is CL(y) = υ−1(U¯ − eL),∀y ∈ Ŷ and
CL(y) = 0, ∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ . The expected payment is
E[CL(Y )] =
∏
θ∈Θ\Θ̂
Pr[θ = 0|eL]υ−1(U¯ − eL),
which is clearly minimized for Θ̂ = ΘA.
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